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Standards-based certification organizations (SBCOs) as a source of market order have 
been largely neglected as a topic of study by social scientists, particularly when 
compared to other sources of order such as the state and the market. This dissertation 
presents three papers that examine the origins of SBCOs, their impact on broader 
regulatory structure, and how they influence market entry and exit rates in the U.S. 
organic food industry.  
The first paper, “Fences and Gates: An Inductive Case Study of Standards-
Based Certification Organizations in the U.S. Organic Food Industry,” employs 
qualitative evidence to develop a typology of SBCOs and then quantitatively assesses 
what facilitating conditions led to the founding of distinctive SBCO forms in U.S. 
states. Findings from this paper suggest that the codification of standards and 
certification processes initially served as a “fence” that established a boundary around 
the concept of organic but which subsequently served as a “gate” by which industry 
outsiders entered the organic industry and engendered endogenous field-level change, 
significantly altering the trajectory of the market.  
The second paper, “Mechanisms Generating Variation: Regulatory Change in 
the Organic Food Industry,” empirically examines how different SBCO forms 
influence variation and evolution in the content of industry law. This approach moves 
beyond extant dichotomous conceptualizations of regulation that dominate 
institutional analyses of regulatory structure. The results of this paper provide answers to questions of when and under what conditions private governance organizations 
influence variation and evolution of industry regulation.  
The third paper, “Certifying the Harvest: The Role of Standards-Based 
Certification Organizations in Market Entry and Exit Dynamics,” examines how 
SBCOs, through key processes of creation of standards, advocacy, verification of 
compliance, and endorsement, influence patterns of market entry and exit of organic 
producers. Drawing on state-level and firm-level data sets spanning a 15-year period 
(1986–2000), I show that SBCOs stimulate entry into the market and that the 
certification they provide to individual firms inhibits market exit and moderates the 
competitive effects of increasing form density.   
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PAPER 1:  
FENCES AND GATES:  
AN INDUCTIVE CASE STUDY OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S. ORGANIC INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent theoretical and empirical work underscores the central role that 
audiences
1 play in the construction and maintenance of form identity, product 
categories and classification structures (Zuckerman 1999; Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll 
2002; Rao, Monin and Durand 2003, 2005). Organizational scholars argue that the 
identity of a particular organizational form/population “inheres in the expectations, 
assumptions, and beliefs held by agents . . .” and that “ownership of an organization’s 
identity resides within an organization’s audience rather than within the organization 
itself” (Hsu and Hannan 2005:476). These audiences, therefore, wield substantial 
power to influence the fate of organizational populations. For example, Zuckerman 
(1999) demonstrated that firms that are not easily categorized by securities analysts 
into pre-existing industry classifications are viewed as less legitimate and suffer a 
discount reflected in their stock price. Complementing Zuckerman’s study, Hsu (2006) 
shows how the evaluative schemata developed by individual movie critics shape their 
own subsequent decisions regarding the movies they review. As these schemata 
become more coherent, movies belonging to favored genre categories tend to receive 
greater critical attention. Wade, Porac, Pollack, and Griffin (2006) explore similar 
processes associated with Financial World’s ranking of exemplary CEOs. They find 
that while stockholders initially value these rankings (positive abnormal stock returns 
following the announcement of the awards), over time the effects dissipate and 
become negative in succeeding months. CEOs materially benefit from the award yet 
                                                 
1 “Audiences” refer to “collections of agents with an interest in a domain and control over material and 
symbolic resources that affect the success and failure of the claimants in the domain” (Hsu and Hannan 
2005:476).  
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face heightened expectations about future performance, and CEO compensation 
continues to improve as long as return on equity remains positive. However, if return 
on equity turns negative, compensation for awarded CEOs is lower than for CEOs 
who never won an award for an equivalent level of performance.  
Despite sustained interest in how such third parties impact the fate and 
dynamics of organizational forms, there is scant research on the origins of such 
audiences and the classification structures they employ (but see Bowker and Star 
1999). As Pólos et al. note, “The framework we propose . . . requires simply that such 
codes come into existence and that controllers of valued resources use these codes in 
granting and withholding access to the resources . . . we simply assert that certain 
social codes exist and get enforced, without specifying who does the enforcing and 
how” (2002:95–96, emphasis added).  
To address this theoretical gap, this paper explores the origins and variation of 
standards-based certification organizations (referred to hereafter as SBCOs) in the 
U.S. organic food industry. By SBCO, I mean an organization whose primary purpose 
is to create and promote standards, verify the compliance of other organizations to 
those standards, and formally acknowledge that an organization has met the standards 
through the conferral of a certification, endorsement, or accreditation. Engaging in 
collective action to develop intra-industry standard-setting bodies as a way to establish 
a product’s identity and stabilize exchange is an important strategy for entrepreneurs 
seeking legitimacy for their nascent industry. These bodies “set the bar” and evaluate 
whether or not firms meet that standard. Such accreditation/certification processes are 
central to continued maintenance of well-established fields such as health care (Ruef 
and Scott 1998; Scott et al. 2000), higher education (Zajac and Kraatz 1993; Casile 
and Davis-Blake 2002), nonprofits (Litwack and Hylton 1962; Singh, House, and 
Tucker 1986), and college sports (Stern 1981; Washington 2004). Although there is a  
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significant amount of research on the legitimation processes of accreditation, there is 
relatively little work that considers the origins of such bodies in nascent markets.  
To uncover key conditions/antecedents and mechanisms that lead to the 
establishment of SBCOs, I employ both qualitative and quantitative evidence to 
develop an inductive case study of the U.S. organic food industry from 1973 to 2000. I 
gathered data on all founding events of organic SBCOs in the United States from 1970 
to 2000. This time frame captures the founding of the first SBCO and tracks all other 
SBCOs founded through 2000, when federal standards dramatically changed the 
market landscape. This context provides a suitable arena to examine the founding and 
evolution of the SBCO as a primary source of industry governance
2 over an extended 
time period.  
Using a multi-method approach, I draw on archival data sources and over 20 
interviews with organic growers and SBCO employees (past and present, including 
presidents and directors). Adapting Rothschild and Whitt’s (1986) typology of 
collectivist-democratic and bureaucratic organizations, I first illustrate how SBCOs 
within the organic food industry varied along five key dimensions: source of 
solidarity, authority structure, social control/relations, incentive structure, and 
specialization. After categorizing these various forms of SBCOs, I focus on the 
temporal and geographic patterning of SBCO founding and quantitatively assess what 
types of facilitating conditions predict the founding of each form of SBCO. While a 
substantial body of research has examined temporal variation in broader types of 
industry governance structures and their impact on industry and organizational 
dynamics (Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg 1991; Ruef and Scott 1998; Scott 
                                                 
2 Governance structures refer to “all those arrangements by which field-level power and authority are 
exercised involving, variously, formal and informal systems, public and private auspices, regulative and 
normative mechanisms” (Scott et al. 2000:172–173). Given the central importance of SBCOs to 
markets and yet the paucity of social science research on their influence on organizational fields (Arhne 
et al. 2000), I bracket my discussion of governance in this paper to SBCOs.   
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et al. 2000), it has neglected the possibility and implications of spatial variation in 
their emergence and importance. While this work counters institutional determinism 
by emphasizing temporal variation and contingency, there is additional theoretical 
value in exploring the antecedents and facilitating conditions that generate unique 
types of governance organizations in geographically differentiated locales.  
The findings of this paper are consistent with extant research that demonstrates 
how the emergence of new types of economic activity and the infrastructure that 
supports them often require and always benefit from a supportive ideological base 
(Stinchcombe 1965; Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000; Scott et al. 
2000:174; Simons and Ingram 2004). In the context of the U.S. organic food industry, 
early organic growers collectively organized to distinguish organic from ordinary food 
by developing a set of processes and practices of how organic food should be 
cultivated. They collectively acted to codify these practices in standards and 
certification procedures that allowed them to create a “discursive opposition” 
(Campbell 2005:51) to conventional agricultural practices and products by which they 
demarcated a solid jurisdictional boundary around the organic food category. In this 
way, early SBCOs and the standards and certification processes they developed served 
as “fences” differentiating their products from conventionally produced food in the 
marketplace. However, this extensive theorization (Strang and Meyer 1993) and 
subsequent codification led to the diffusion and transposition of the organic concept to 
different locales that became instantiated in a host of unique forms of SBCOs, 
enabling the entry of “movement outsiders” to begin to populate the market and 
engender change among all participants (including incumbents) in the marketplace. In 
this way, SBCOs served as “gates”—providing a means by which outsiders to the 
organic movement could access, participate in, and significantly alter the trajectory of 
the growing market.   
5 
This understanding provides insight into questions of endogenous field-level 
change in institutional theory (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). I find that 
geographically differentiated locales provide seedbeds for the emergence and 
development of unique intra-industry governance arrangements. As these 
arrangements diffuse and are “translated” (Czarniawska-Joerges and Sevon 1996; 
Campbell 2005) to fit local social and institutional contexts, they become sources of 
institutional variation and contestation as spatially dispersed pockets of economic 
activity are knit together through industry growth and consolidation. These processes 
provide insight into how industry-generated governance structures facilitate “market 
incursions into previously protected fields” (e.g., Zelizer 1978; Thornton and Ocasio 
1999; Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch 2003), which 
represent a “pressing need for research” (Davis and Marquis 2005:341).  
In the next section, I focus on the development and origins of third-party 
certification organizations in the organic food industry. I then use quantitative data to 
illustrate the factors and antecedents that drive heterogeneity in SBCO organizational 
form. I conclude with a discussion of the various ways that the study of SBCOs can 
expand our understanding of institutional change. 
THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT AND INDUSTRY GOVERNANCE 
The early North American organic movement built upon earlier food reform 
movements such as the early vegetarian and whole wheat crusades, the pure food 
campaigns, and the back-to-the-land movement.
3 Its chief advocate in the United 
States was J. I. Rodale, a publisher-turned-organic farmer. In the early 1940s, Rodale 
purchased a farm in Pennsylvania and, with no experience as a farmer, drew heavily 
on the work of a cohort of scholars and farmers
4 who believed that agriculture was 
                                                 
3 See chapter three of Peters 1979 for a review of these movements. 
4 Prominent pioneers of organic agricultural thought and practice and their writings include: F. H. King, 
Farmers for Forty Centuries, or Permanent Agriculture in China, Korea, and Japan, 1911; Rudolph  
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better understood and practiced through biological and ecological principles. 
Important organic farming practices used and tested by Rodale included green 
manuring, drainage techniques, composting, and soil aeration. These practices were 
grounded in the belief that all waste must return to the soil to replenish necessary 
nutrients and minerals, creating an unbroken chain of health from waste to soil to plant 
to animal to human.  
To advocate organic farming practices more widely, Rodale launched a 
magazine in 1942 called Organic Farming and Gardening. The magazine served as a 
“meeting place” where readers exchanged ideas regarding their organic agriculture 
experiences (Rodale 1942:14). Rodale also founded the Soil and Health Foundation 
(which later became the Rodale Institute), through which he published highly 
influential books that became key sources of information for pioneering organic 
farmers. In his 1948 book, Rodale attempted to formalize the concept of organic 
agriculture by issuing a creed of “organiculturists,” outlining the fundamental 
principles and practices of organic agriculture: 
Organiculturists are: . . . opposed to artificial or chemical fertilizers . . . make 
compost by Sir Albert Howard’s Indore process . . . see soil as a living, 
breathing entity which requires that crops are rotated and that land must lie 
fallow at regulated intervals . . . observe the Law of Return, restoring to the 
soil all plant residues that came from it . . . reject the use of poison sprays in 
orchards and on farm crops . . . are not in favor (at least at this time) of the use 
of human excrement or sewage sludge on food crops . . . and are trusted with 
the sacred trust of producing food that will impart health to the people who 
consume it. As a patriotic duty he assumes the obligation to preserve the 
fertility of the soil, a precious heritage that he must pass on, undefiled and even 
enriched, to subsequent generations. (p. 68)  
Rodale’s early efforts to generate interest and support for organic food were 
largely unsuccessful. In the first year of publication, Rodale’s magazine had only ten 
                                                                                                                                              
Steiner, Agriculture: A Course of Eight Lectures, 1924; Sir Albert Howard, An Agricultural Testament, 
1940; and Lady Eve Balfour, The Living Soil, 1943.   
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subscribers. However, the virtues and value of organic food became increasingly 
salient as broader movements surrounding environmentalism drew the public’s 
attention to the dangers of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals (Carson 1962). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, organic agriculture and its associated practices resonated 
with an increasing audience of gardeners, farmers, and consumers. By 1960, 
subscriptions to Rodale’s publications had risen to 260,000. By 1980, subscriptions to 
Organic Gardening reached above 1,3000,000.  
As interest in organic farming grew, maintaining the integrity of the organic 
concept became paramount for movement farmers and consumers. As a 1972 article in 
Organic Gardening and Farming emphasized, “We’ve all got to raise our voices and 
let the rest of the country know that organic is our word, that it means something to us, 
and that we are going to defend it to the best of our ability” (Rodale 1972:44). In an 
effort to fend off misrepresentation and fraud, initial solutions offered by movement 
insiders included growing the food yourself, buying from a trusted farmer, or 
enquiring about the retailer’s definition of organic and his relationship to the farmer. 
Despite these short-term solutions, Rodale (1971) realized that the development of a 
viable organic market would require a more systematic verification method: 
“Eventually, a foolproof organic certifying procedure will have to be developed, or the 
commercial market for unchemicalized food will not develop” (p. 74).  
In 1971, under Rodale’s supervision, Organic Gardening and Farming (OGF) 
initiated a pilot organic certification program in California. The program consisted of 
obtaining a commitment from each farmer to build or maintain three percent humus 
content in the soil within five years. An organic seal was developed to identify the 
commitment, commodity, and location of the farmer. Soil analyses, residue analyses, 
and personal inspections were also part of the program (Allen 1971:81). The OGF 
certification program grew to include regional groups in twenty states. After two  
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years, OGF phased out the certification program because it was believed that 
“certification programs are best developed by organic farmers and the people directly 
associated with the distribution and consumption of their harvests, on a grass-roots, 
regional basis” (Foote and Goldstein 1973:89). Rodale’s pilot program was 
discontinued in 1973.  
Following the discontinuation of this program, a myriad of certification 
organizations cropped up across the U.S. during the next thirty years. While 
significant variation existed in these organizations in terms of their geographic scope, 
motivations, organizational structures, target clientele, and procedures, their primary 
functions included the establishment of standards and the certification and verification 
of “organically grown” claims from farmers. This involved extensive paperwork, 
annual and spot inspections, various crop and soil sampling, payment of dues and fees, 
and an agreement to abide by practices and rules set by the certification organization. 
Over time, certification organizations achieved significant normative, extralegal power 
to deal with those growers not measuring up to the standards. That power was 
manifest in SBCOs’ ability to prohibit a certain crop to be sold as certified organic, to 
impose fines, and to decertify a grower not in compliance with the standards and 
required procedures. In these matters, the burden of proof nearly always rested on the 
suspected grower (Guthman 2004). As such, SBCOs clearly retained substantial power 
not only in defining the parameters of what organic included, but also in determining 
who could actively be a player in the emerging market.  
Early standards creation and certification efforts in the 1970s were organized 
around local nonprofits that primarily represented the interests of small, organic 
farmers (whose products and anticapitalist ideologies were largely ignored by 
mainstream agribusiness). As the organic food market grew in the 1980s, the Organic 
Crops Improvement Association (OCIA) entered the certification field by developing  
9 
an international, federated structure that facilitated the entrance of larger farms and 
agribusiness interests into the emerging market. Finally, in the mid-1980s (and 
particularly in the early 1990s), state governments established their own certification 
agencies, and private certification organizations began to populate the field.
5 The 
emergence and growth of SBCOs in the U.S. organic food industry exhibited fairly 
distinct temporal and spatial patterning. Figure 1.1 shows the temporal emergence of 
SBCOs in the U.S. organic food industry from 1970 to 2000 and Figure 1.2 shows 
their spatial emergence.  
 
FIGURE 1.1: CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF SBCOs, 1970–2000 
                                                 
5 Information on private certification organizations was not readily forthcoming, and although they 
captured much of the certification market (particularly the certifier Quality Assurance International), 
data were not available on the states in which these for-profit certifiers operated. Furthermore, during 
the study period, only six for-profit certification organizations populated the field, making statistical 
analysis difficult.  
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In the remainder of this section, I draw upon interviews and historical archival 
data sources to describe these three categories of certification organizations.  
Local Nonprofit SBCOs 
By local nonprofits, I refer to SBCOs that were incorporated as nonprofit 
organizations at the intrastate level and were formed by local organic growers. These 
organizations almost exclusively certified growers within their state of founding 
(although some in later years of the industry began to certify beyond the borders of 
their founding state). Following the termination of the OGF program, the California 
Certified Organic Farmers (CCOF) became the first organization to independently 
certify growers. In the first newsletter published by CCOF (1974), the founders of the 
organization wrote,  
We feel that the primary purpose of our organization is to rid the organic food 
industry of the phonies. As an organization and as individuals, we are 
dedicated to this purpose. By offering to the public organically grown food that 
has been certified by our organization, we feel that in due time all consumers 
will be able to walk into health food or natural food stores and be certain that 
he is buying organically grown food which it is so labeled. Our individual 
dedication to this organization is not for personal profit or glory, but merely for 
the protection of the consumer and the honest members of this industry. To this 
cause we have all devoted much time, effort and money and for this cause we 
will continue. (p. 2)  
After the creation of CCOF, nonprofit certification organizations formed from 
local networks of farmers throughout the United States. As shown in Figure 1.2, all 
certification organizations in the United States before 1985 were local nonprofits. The 
earliest certification organizations appeared in California, Oregon, Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Michigan, and Minnesota. Over time, more local nonprofits 
were founded throughout the Northeast, primarily along the eastern seaboard and then 
moving south and west.   
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FIGURE 1.2: GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNING OF SBCOs, BY FORM    
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Local nonprofit SBCOs absorbed much of the risk and costs associated with 
experimentation and illegitimacy in the early moments of the industry. Their 
collectivist ideals served as a sustaining motivation in the face of limited economic 
benefit accruing to early growers. These local nonprofit SBCOs were institutional 
entrepreneurs that established the identity, legitimacy, and accountability of the 
organic industry, guaranteed the quality and value of its products and services, and 
increased the integrity and reliability of growers. They accomplished this through the 
creation of a set of standards and verification procedures that subsequently diffused 
and were transposed in other locales by a variety of actors.  
OCIA 
Although founding generation members of social movement organizations may 
be attached to a broader social movement and its ideology, second generation 
members often tend to be oriented more toward the goals and services of only a 
particular organization, rather than those of the movement at large (Rothschild and 
Whitt 1986). In a similar fashion, a “second generation” form of SBCO exhibited 
marked differences from its early local nonprofit predecessors. In 1985, the Organic 
Crop Improvement Association (OCIA) grew out of Organic Farms, Inc., a wholesale 
distributor in Beltsville, Maryland, that sought a summer source of fresh vegetables 
that could not be grown in the South. To this end, OCIA established two pilot 
programs, one in Vermont and one in Quebec. As part of the programs, OCIA 
demanded certification from growers, funding their participation for the first year with 
the understanding that growers would then take responsibility to run the program 
thereafter. OCIA was to then serve as an accreditation body over these and all other 
existing certification programs, including local nonprofits. However, local nonprofits 
declined the proposition in order to maintain control over their own standards and 
certification processes.   
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Although the program stalled in Vermont (for reasons that will be explicated in 
more detail below) the program caught on in Quebec and then spread to Ontario. By 
1986, OCIA had 35 members (CAAP 1986). Shortly thereafter, OCIA grew 
significantly, establishing chapters and affiliates throughout various parts of the 
United States and Canada, focusing on serving international markets for certified 
organic food primarily in Europe and Japan. By 1989, OCIA had established chapters 
in 11 states and boasted a membership in North, Central, and South America of over 
6,000 producers. In the United States, OCIA established a strong presence in Illinois, 
Indiana, and Nebraska, and then fortified its influence and presence in other 
Midwestern states. By 2000, OCIA had 35 chapters in 16 states. Much of the later 
growth of the organization came from the founding of multiple chapters in the same 
state.
6 
State Certification Organizations 
Beginning in 1985, state bureaucracies forayed into organic certification. In 
1985, Washington state lawmakers gave the director of the Department of Agriculture 
the prerogative to create and modify a materials list
7 and to be responsible for the 
enforcement of the law. This was the most power given to a state department of 
agriculture to this point in the industry. Exercising that power in 1986, the Washington 
Department of Agriculture created the first state-run certification organization in the 
United States, a move that subsequent state departments of agriculture would follow, 
beginning with Texas. Public pressure and the recognition of the potential revenue for 
the state played important roles in initiating these two states’ involvement in the 
organic food market.  
                                                 
6 The majority of OCIA-dominated states had multiple chapters (11 out of 16). 
7 A materials list refers to materials listed as either allowed, restricted, or prohibited in the production, 
processing, and handling of organic food.   
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The Washington program materialized as a result of grassroots efforts by the 
grower-run Tilth Producer’s Cooperative (TPC) that previously certified organic 
producers. In 1985 this group, along with a local five-store retail consumers’ 
cooperative, began pushing for an organic food law. Two years later, additional 
legislation mandated the establishment of a certification program under the 
Washington Department of Agriculture (Friedman and Fishman 1989). 
In contrast to Washington, whose legislation was driven by industry 
participants, the Texas Department of Agriculture was proactive, taking the initiative 
to establish a state organic program. To determine the potential of the organic food 
market, the Texas Department of Agriculture (TDA) conducted a survey and found 
that there existed a potential $35 million organic market in Texas, with 90 percent of 
the products coming from California. To capture some of that market, the TDA 
implemented a comprehensive certification program to encourage Texas producers to 
farm organically in order to supply their own state’s demand for such products. The 
Texas legislature approved $45,000 for the development of the program, which served 
as a model for other state programs (Friedman and Fishman 1989). 
The efforts of the Washington and Texas Departments of Agriculture set the 
stage for other states to take a proactive role in the industry. As shown in Figure 1.1, 
state agencies did not get involved in certification until 1986—long after local 
nonprofit SBCOs had laid the groundwork by developing standards, providing models 
of how to organize, and establishing markets. After the initial founding of the first 
state-sponsored certification organizations in Washington and Texas, a spate of other 
state organization foundings occurred. By 1993, 8 additional states had established 
state certification organizations. By 2000, that number reached 14.  
The geographic pattern of state certification foundings shows that most state 
certification organizations were founded primarily in the Rocky Mountain States, the  
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Southwest, and the South Central states of Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana. Figure 
1.2 shows that state certification organizations were largely founded in states that had 
neither local nonprofit nor OCIA chapters. 
A TYPOLOGY OF SBCOs 
Although each of the three forms of certification organizations discussed above 
performed the same functions of setting industry standards and verifying compliance 
to those standards, they varied in important ways. This variance and its relationship to 
the temporal and spatial history of the industry is theoretically significant because the 
geographic and temporal patterning indicates the way in which SBCOs first served as 
jurisdictional “fences” but then later and in different geographic locations served as 
“gates” by which growers distinct from those pioneering the industry entered the 
industry.  
To develop the distinctions between SBCO forms, I adapt Rothschild and 
Whitt’s (1986) typology of ideal types of bureaucratic and collectivist-democratic 
organizations to highlight five important dimensions (source of solidarity, authority 
structure, social control/relations, incentive structure, and specialization) along which 
differences in these forms can be identified. Table 1.1 outlines and describes these 
dimensions. As the foregoing analysis of these dimensions illustrates, the three major 
categories of SBCOs in the organic food industry (local nonprofit, OCIA, and state-
level certifiers) adhere roughly to a continuum in which the ideal types of bureaucratic 
and collectivist-democratic are at each end. It should be emphasized that this typology 
is a continuum, given that few organizations completely embody purely bureaucratic 
or collectivist-democratic ideals. What follows is a narrative analysis of each of the 
five dimensions as they apply to the three major categories of SBCOs in the organic 
food industry. These dimensions then offer a point of departure for examining the 
conditions that predict the presence of one form of SBCO over another.  
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TABLE 1.1: IDEAL-TYPICAL DIMENSIONS OF COLLECTIVIST-
DEMOCRATIC AND BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS
* 
Dimensions Collectivist-democratic  Bureaucratic 
Source of Solidarity  Ideological; strength contingent 
upon the number and intensity 
of adherents to ideology  
 
Self interest; strength of 
solidarity contingent upon 
shared material interests 
Authority Structure  Resides in the collectivity as a 
whole; rules are minimized and 
developed by democratic means 
 
Resides in individuals by virtue 
of their incumbency in office 
and/or expertise; universal, 
fixed rules are developed and 
implemented by office 
incumbents 
Social Control/Relations  Social control based on 
personalistic and/or moral 
appeals 
 
Concept of community is 
paramount. Relations are 
personal and intrinsically 
valuable 
Social control achieved through 
supervision, standardized rules 
and sanctions  
 
Concept of impersonality is 
paramount. Relations are role 
based and instrumental 
Incentive Structure  Normative and solidarity 
incentives prevail over material 
incentives  
Remunerative incentives prevail 
over norms and solidarity 
Specialization   Functions are generalized and 
organization often provides 
additional services beyond its 
officially stated purpose 
Functions are specialized and 
segmented  
* Adapted from Rothschild and Whitt 1986 
Dimension 1. Source of Solidarity  
For many industry pioneers, participation in the early organic movement was 
largely predicated upon ideological grounds. The source of solidarity for these 
participants was a set of shared ideals-turned-practices, many of which were part and 
parcel of larger countercultural movements of the time.  
Many of the “political” enthusiasts were hangers-on from the 1960s, initially 
student, civil-rights, and environmental activists, turned now to the land. These 
enthusiasts frequently thought of themselves as organizers, bent on mobilizing  
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the organic movement to a new political self-consciousness . . . These 
advocates were articulate in other visions of the movement, including 
anarchist, Marxist, communal, and decentralist ideals. This “politics”, vaguely 
stated, left many questions unanswered, but it created a distinct identity for 
many enthusiasts. (Peters 1979:12) 
One industry insider describes the countercultural landscape of the time as 
follows: 
What else was happening back in the early mid 70s? The back-to-the-land 
movement. So you had a lot of communes. You had a lot of people that were 
militantly opposed to capitalism who were trying to set up an alternative 
production and distribution system, not necessarily Marxist, but not necessarily 
pursuing profit either. They were trying to figure out how to fulfill a higher 
objective. Paramount among them was the Sunburst Commune in Santa 
Barbara County. Amigo Bob came out of that. A whole lot of people who are 
still in organic farming today, got started on communes. And were trying to 
figure out ways to keep organic food moving without having to deal with the 
Man. That is really hard to explain to people about what that meant for 
organizational stability and accountability and all that. (Interview, June 20, 
2006) 
The “‘politics’, vaguely stated” and “the higher objective” mentioned in these 
quotes refer to the primary source of solidarity for early movement actors. Based on a 
critique of mainstream systems of production, distribution, and consumption, the 
ideological impetus for the organic food movement was a commitment to all-
encompassing economic, social, and ecological ideals. An early industry publication 
articulates these ideals as follows:    
The wheel on the back cover . . . depicts a wholistic alternative to a corporate 
industrial food system. Though it might be argued that food is food regardless 
of the system by which it is produced, the differences between the 
commercially and ecologically accountable systems to food and agriculture are 
major. Differences in motivation, rationale and worldview manifest themselves 
in the way land and people are mobilized, how food is produced and how foods 
are distributed and ultimately utilized. By definition, the corporate industrial 
food system is profit motivated. This places a priority on immediate results and 
accountability measured in terms of economic gains. What follows is a stress 
on maximum yield stimulated by intensive use of capital and technology  
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accompanied by exploitation of energy and displacement of people. Though 
considerations for conservation, ecology and social implications are best 
alluded to, they are secondary and rhetorical at best. In contrast, a system of 
food and agriculture motivated more by ecological and social considerations 
over profit accountability is based on a different set of assumptions which 
expresses itself in stressing optimum over maximum yields; techniques that 
value human and biological inputs over technological ones; energy 
conservation over energy exploitation; methods that are labor intensive more 
than capital intensive, especially where the later is limited and former is 
abundant. On the time scale, the concern is with posterity as well as immediate 
gains. The implications of such contrasting regard for resources, people and 
food command serious attention. (Fujimoto 1976:v) 
As the earliest certifiers in the industry, composed primarily of industry 
pioneers, local nonprofit SBCOs shared the ideological source of solidarity of the 
early movement at large. Seeking to protect their ideals and the products they 
embodied, local nonprofits formed to promote and endorse conceptions of “organic” 
that were consistent with early movement trends. In emotive, dogmatic language, 
CCOF, the first local nonprofit SBCO, clearly alluded to its ideological roots in its 
first newsletter.  
. . . more and more energy and dollars are spent every year in devitalizing, 
refining, and generally rendering useless and sometimes dangerous the food 
the world so desperately needs. This same sort of “wisdom” takes our most 
precious resource—the soil, and violates and rapes it in every way possible. It 
turns this source of life both literally and figuratively into concrete and sees to 
it that fewer and fewer people have access to it . . . To re-make our lives with 
unprocessed and organically grown foods is no longer a fad or life style, it’s 
becoming a necessity. The more people that we can expose to these foods, the 
better their lives will become, and the better chance we will all have for 
survival. In many ways it’s a dark picture, but at the same time it’s the most 
exciting challenge we have yet to face. (Hillyard 1974:14)  
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While the motivations of individual members varied,
8 local nonprofits that followed 
continued to found largely on the ideological groundwork of movement pioneers such 
as CCOF.  
In contrast to local nonprofits, OCIA members’ participation in the organic 
industry was unequivocally rooted in market-related concerns. Many of the OCIA 
farmers I interviewed suggested that their transition from conventional to organic 
agriculture was driven by economic necessity/opportunity. One farmer in Montana 
reported,  “I wouldn’t be farming today if it weren’t for organics . . . I got into 
organics because I was broke and had a lot of new land that was virgin sod . . . I got 
into it purely because of economics” (Interview, May 22, 2003). Another OCIA-
certified farmer from Iowa reported that her transition to organic was simply a 
consequence of trying to cut costs as interest rates escalated during the late 1980s. To 
save money, she began to reduce the amount of chemicals she used on the land. This 
slow reduction allowed her to eventually transition into organic farming, which 
ultimately prevented her farm from going bankrupt. This motivation was echoed by a 
farmer in Ontario who stated, “I don’t think we were taking advantage of a consumer 
                                                 
8 A recent critique of the literature that examines growers’ motivations for practicing organic agriculture 
suggests that the organic/conventional divide that casts organic farmers as purely ideological and 
conventional farmers driven only by economic profit is a false dualism (Guthman 2004). Guthman 
argues that the dichotomy neglects how motivations shift as a result of individual agronomic and 
financial success and/or broader changes in the growth of the organic market. Nonetheless, it is 
undisputed that farmers that entered agriculture as organic farmers indeed identify very strongly with 
the idea that organic agriculture is a countercultural ideology. It is also generally true that smaller 
growers more closely identify with social movement ideals, whereas larger farms are (or were) nearly 
always operate under a more business-oriented logic (Guthman 2004). With regard to local nonprofits 
and their founders, I find a similar phenomenon: those that founded these organizations tended to be 
much more committed to the idealism underpinning organic agriculture than were other types of 
certification organizations. However, it is naïve to think that local nonprofit SBCOs did not permit 
farmers to be certified who were driven primarily by economic motivations. For example, one 
informant, in describing the membership motivations of the local nonprofit SBCO that she was involved 
with, suggested that there was “a mix between people who got into it because of 
philosophical/ideological reasons and people who were really practical, business oriented; there wasn’t 
a surfeit of business-oriented people, but some of them became that way when they realized that was 
the only way it was gonna work, you know what I mean? [laughing]” (Interview, June 28, 2006).   
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that was interested in organics. We were trying to recover more of our costs of 
production by not using chemicals” (Interview, June 16, 2005).  
OCIA farmers not only certified to address cost issues of production, they also 
wanted to satisfy the demands of downstream buyers and wholesalers in the value 
chain. A Kansas grain grower explained that he initially resisted certification because 
he did not want to have to deal with the bureaucracy. He noted, “Back in the day, it 
was just a phone call and an affidavit. This was all that certification consisted of” 
(Interview, May 28, 2003). However, he finally decided to certify in 1984 when he 
sent a millet crop to Arkansas, where it was not accepted. It was at that point he 
decided to become certified. Similarly, an Ontario farmer recounted that growers in 
his OCIA chapter and those in the Saskatchewan chapter came to third-party 
certification by necessity: “Their customers in Europe needed some guarantee that 
some kinds of standards were being used in certification. From Saskatchewan, a lot of 
wheat was going to Europe. They got involved in OCIA because of marketing 
opportunities . . . their market dictated to them that they had to do that” (Interview, 
June 16, 2005). He further noted, “I think their market was dictating to them to have a 
third-party certification more so than the farmers themselves were” (Interview, June 
16, 2005).  
As quotes from OCIA farmers indicate, the market-driven necessities of 
conventional farmers at the time allowed OCIA leadership to draw on a clear-cut 
economic source of solidarity to establish and promote their certification efforts. As 
one farmer puts it, the transition from conventional to organic farming was made 
easier because the OCIA representative “was really a salesman. He got people 
enthused and farmers had heard that organic oats were a good deal” (Interview, June 
10, 2003). The ideological source of solidarity that was so evident in local nonprofit 
certification, and the organic movement at large, was conspicuously diminished for  
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OCIA and its “conventional, run-of-the-mill farmers” (Interview, June 16, 2005), as 
one informant called them. The contrasting sources of solidarity were described by an 
OCIA farmer: “I started going to the Anaheim food show in ’92 and that was a trip—
that was a trip. The people in that show, I mean, I had never seen these kind of weird 
people in my life, really in my life—it was something.” When asked if OCIA had 
“weird people” in their ranks, she said, “Some, but very few. Most came from people 
who were just about to lose their farms and this [organic farming] was something that 
will maybe work . . . and I know people that it has saved their farm (Interview, July 
23, 2004). 
In contrast to local nonprofit SBCOs and OCIA, each of which had clearly 
evidenced sources of solidarity, state SBCOs embodied more of the ideal bureaucratic 
organization. According to Weber (1978), modern bureaucracy is established on the 
basis of rational-legal authority. Consistent with Weber’s conception of bureaucracy, 
state SBCOs exhibited ideal-typical characteristics such as rule and role formalization, 
impersonal and instrumental relations, valorization of remunerative incentives, and 
advancement based on achievement. These bureaucratic elements obviated the need 
for other sources of solidarity (ideological, regional, etc.) for the continued 
maintenance of state SBCOs; they had the institutional mandate and financial backing 
of the respective state governments.  
Dimension 2. Authority Structure  
Rothschild and Whitt note that the “collectivist-democratic organization rejects 
bureaucratic justifications for authority. Here authority rests not with the 
individual . . . but resides in the collectivity . . . collectives seek not the transference of 
power from one official to another, but the abolition of the pyramid in toto: 
organization without hierarchy” (1986:51). Although local nonprofit SBCOs were not 
as opposed to organizational hierarchy as the ideal-typical collectivist organization,  
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they exhibited a clear preference for and commitment to decentralized and democratic 
decision-making. For example, one of the founders of the Northeast Organic Farmers 
Association of Vermont, a local nonprofit, described the organization’s process for 
writing standards: “We had a committee and we drafted some standards and extracted 
some comments and feedback from people and it went on a few rounds and then we 
agreed upon it. We had a pretty strong commitment to a democratic, open process” 
(Interview, June 28, 2006). Commenting on the structure of authority in the California 
Certified Organic Farmers (CCOF), Guthman (2004) states, “There was a strong 
countercultural element within CCOF and among nonaffiliated organic growers as 
well, evidenced in the idiom they used in reference to their annual meetings: ‘tribal 
gatherings.’ This idiom was barrier enough to other, less countercultural growers for a 
long time. In addition, the original CCOF growers were notably resistant to formality; 
it was not until the late 1980s that CCOF received proper tax status from the Internal 
Revenue Service and filed its first tax returns” (p. 112).
9 CCOF strove to have 
members vote and control the establishment of standards and direction of the 
organization. A former employee of two local nonprofit SBCOs stated that all early 
certification organizations had a very similar commitment to decentralized and 
democratic decision-making processes (Interview, June 20, 2006).  
In contrast to the organizational structure of local nonprofit SBCOs that 
preserved collective decision making as much as possible, as an international certifier, 
OCIA established chapters in multiple states that had six or more members and then 
appointed unpaid chapter presidents to be responsible for completing all of the 
paperwork associated with certification and inspection for each farmer. OCIA 
members were actively recruited to join chapters, and OCIA would establish a chapter 
                                                 
9 Nonetheless, they did see the need for some structure: “While it is possible for short-lived groups to 
operate without defined levels of authority, all organizations that intend on being around for a while 
must set down their delineation of authority” (Cain 1984:4).  
23 
only if a minimum number of farmers would certify. While the chapters completed all 
of the paperwork and conducted inspections, decisions about standards were made by 
the international body. One of the founders describes his justification for a federated 
structure:  
. . . one of the things I noticed was that everyone was developing their own 
standards and my idea was to have a standard that was universal across the 
country . . . My idea was to take the chapters and form an international body 
where all of the chapters belonged and everyone worked on the same 
standards. We met in Albany [New York] and there was quite a number of 
different groups represented there. [all OCIA groups—it was very loose at that 
time]. We agreed to work on one set of standards and we left that meeting with 
an international body to take care of standards. (Interview, June 16, 2005) 
This approach was not amenable to the participants in the OCIA pilot program in 
Vermont. The director of the program at that time noted,  
OCIA was in VT for only year or two. I mean mostly people were very 
suspicious, it began to seem like something that wasn’t what was advertised as 
and the growers weren’t having the control that they were promised. They 
didn’t want to pay the cost of affiliating with this national thing, they didn’t 
have an interest in national markets, so they decided to turn it into, I think at 
that point it was turned into the name, Vermont Organic Farmers which is what 
it still is. (Interview, June 28, 2006) 
Similar disillusionment occurred at a much later date in Montana. Before 1999, 
Montana growers were certified largely by OCIA. In an effort to gain local control, a 
group of farmers sought to develop a state certification program. The legislature gave 
seed money for an investigation of the certification process. They polled all organic 
growers in the state, and more than 60 percent of the growers wanted a state-run 
certification program. The program was put in place in 2001. 
In the case of state SBCOs, all authority to make decisions resided with the 
department and the various individuals responsible for administering the program 
(generally the state department of agriculture). Nonetheless, state SBCOs generally  
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had an advisory board constituted of department employees, organic producers, 
consumers, and cooperative extension employees. These boards assisted the director 
of the program in formulating and carrying out the state organic program. 
Nonetheless, there were clear delineations of authority, and that authority resided with 
individuals by virtue of their incumbency in office (Weber 1978; Rothschild and Whitt 
1986).  
Dimension 3. Social control/social relations 
Generally speaking, collectivist organizations tend to shun the use of 
centralized authority or standardized rules to achieve social control. Rather, they rely 
on personalistic and moralistic appeals to achieve social control (Rothschild and Whitt 
1986). Inherent in the functional purpose of SBCOs is to monitor and verify the degree 
of compliance by organizations that subscribe to their standards. Consequently, 
SBCOs rely on some supervision, standardized rules, and procedures to legitimately 
claim to achieve their purposes. Nonetheless, the degree to which social control in 
certification occurred via social relations (personalistic/moralistic) versus impersonal 
and impartial third-party verification varied by SBCO form. For instance, certification 
of farms by early local nonprofit SBCOs occurred through what one informant called 
“the buddy system.” This referred to the practice of organic growers certifying one 
another—no truly impartial third party was doing the monitoring. He stated that most 
early certification was done “largely by the buddy system. And it remained by the 
buddy system until I was hired [1987]. Not that there was anything wrong with it. I 
mean, seriously the buddy system was an economic way of market enforcement that 
required accountability and responsibility on a very personal basis. You had your 
peers, competitors and neighbors checking you out” (Interview, June 20, 2006). When 
asked whether it was successful and whether farmers lived up to the standards, he said,  
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“It depends on who you ask and if you are asking me, the situation was adequate up 
until a certain point” (Interview, June 20, 2006). 
By virtue of being an internationally federated organization with multiple 
chapters in multiple locales, OCIA naturally relied on more centralized authority and 
standardized rules to achieve social control. However, while OCIA centralized much 
of the decision-making regarding the creation and modification of standards, it was 
fairly decentralized in other ways. Consequently, there were wide disparities in the 
running of many of the chapters (Guthman 2004). One of the founders of OCIA 
recounted the state of affairs in the organization’s early days:  
. . . I got interested in the third-party thing by being questioned in the 
marketplace and knowing that we had to have standards. In the early days, 
there wasn’t anything organized, and so we organized our own standard based 
on European standards, IFOAM standards, basically. And . . . I would do a lot 
of my own inspections. (Interview, June 16, 2005) 
An informant who worked for OCIA suggested that because certification decisions 
were made locally, the door was opened for opportunism and fraudulent practices in 
OCIA chapters:   
. . . decisions about things like the standards were set up to be more national, to 
be done for the whole system. But the certification decisions were made 
locally. I don’t have any first-hand information about this, but I have certainly 
heard enough stories about the cronies club in the local areas tolerating some 
shady things. (Interview, June 28, 2006) 
Documentation of OCIA’s activities in California revealed similar issues. In the 1990s 
in California, OCIA for a time had growers directly paying the inspectors of their 
farms. Additional internal controversies involving allegations of improper certification 
practices led to the disbarment of the California chapter. Furthermore, OCIA was 
implicated in a 1995 suit that named OCIA and QAI (a private certifier) as having  
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certified fungicide-treated bananas (Guthman 2004). OCIA, like local nonprofits, were 
engaging in “buddy system”-like tactics but became mired in controversy.  
Social relations in OCIA were ostensibly characterized much more by 
impersonality and instrumentality and a disinterest in community building than were 
social relations among local nonprofit certifiers’ growers. One of the founders of 
OCIA noted that OCIA farmers were “an independent lot,” and a past president, 
commenting on the willingness of OCIA members to lobby for legislation, noted that 
“Most of them [the farmers] said, ‘I just want to farm my fields’” (Interview, July 23, 
2004).  
Social control, particularly in the context of certification, differed significantly 
for state SBCOs relative to local nonprofit SBCOs and OCIA. By virtue of being run 
by the state, state SBCOs brought added credibility and objectivity to verification and 
certification processes through impersonal, impartial, and standardized third-party 
verification. For example, the Texas program redressed “some of the more difficult 
issues that have been plaguing the organic industry for years ” by ensuring objective 
third-party certification through hiring independent inspectors, implementing a 
pesticide residue testing program, clarifying farm questionnaires, and bolstering its 
materials list (Friedman and Fishman 1989:135). 
Dimension 4. Incentive structure  
Instead of relying on remunerative incentives, collectivist organizations depend 
on a sense of shared purpose and relational ties to generate commitment to the 
organization (Etzioni 1961; Zald and Ash 1966; Kanter 1968; Rothschild and Whitt 
1986). Local nonprofit SBCOs relied heavily on work that was accomplished through 
underpaid and, more often, volunteer labor. One of the first paid employees for a local 
nonprofit SBCO recalled a conversation with one of the founders of the SBCO:   
27 
I had the good fortune of speaking with __ __ before he passed on. And __ was 
many things, but he was a person who was definitely a partisan for a 
decentralized farmer-based system. To his dying day, true to his word, I mean 
he had nothing against me personally, but he thought I was an absolute parasite 
for taking a salary based on taxing farmers. You know, “death to the 
bureaucrats who prey on the lives of the peasants.” And that perspective 
persisted. You know what, [this organization], through its volunteer structure, 
and through its dedication, survived. (Interview, June 20, 2006) 
He further commented on the work of one of the early presidents of the SBCO:  
Still, __ maintained the organization. He did the minimum that was needed to 
keep it afloat. Many people said he did more than the minimum needed. 
Without compensation, he put in a tremendous amount of time and kept it 
alive . . . with [this organization] it was a labor of love. (Interview, June 20, 
2006) 
Like its local nonprofit counterparts, OCIA was initially established using a set 
of volunteers to accomplish the work of certifying all farms. At the local level, OCIA 
would appoint an unpaid chapter president who was responsible for completing all of 
the paperwork for each farmer in the chapter. A past director of OCIA reported that 
the system did not work because “those were volunteer positions and you can’t get 
people to continually volunteer and it always ends up with one person doing all the 
work. People have to want to do that and understand that they have to contribute and 
that it’s work” (Interview, July 23, 2004). The use of volunteers in OCIA was a 
concern from the beginning, according to one of the founders:  
. . . being a membership organization, one of the drawbacks was that everyone 
wanted to belong to the organization and get their work done for near nothing. 
But we didn’t have the funding to pay all the people that were doing the work 
to get the applications ready and doing the actually reviewing and end up 
giving the certification. So everything was volunteer and the people that were 
good at it soon got burned out and they weren’t being rewarded. The 
organization with that system was not working very well in my opinion and 
soon, me and several other guys decided to start a new group that was a fee for 
service. If someone wanted to be certified, you were a client rather than a 
member. We went down that road. OCIA disappeared in Ontario for some of 
the reasons that I mentioned. There was nothing wrong with their standards or  
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their actual certification. It’s just the organization just couldn’t survive under 
that model of volunteer help. (Interview, June 16, 2005) 
These quotes suggest that from the very beginning, OCIA was unable to 
function using a volunteer system to accomplish its goals because such a structure was 
not conducive to the members it was meant to serve. As noted, one of the founders of 
OCIA broke away and started a group that relied on a bureaucratic structure that 
treated those seeking certification as “clients” rather than “members.” 
State SBCOs obviously did not draw on normative and solidarity incentives to 
ensure that employees performed their expected activities and tasks. While employees 
of state SBCOs were often sympathetic to the ideals espoused by many of those in the 
local nonprofit SBCOs, their organization did not have to rely on their employees’ 
commitment to the ideal to ensure continued functioning of the organization. 
Receiving a salary also had the effect of increasing continuity in personnel as they 
were adequately compensated for their work.  
Dimension 5. Specialization 
Many local nonprofit SBCOs engaged in a variety of tasks beyond the core 
function of certification such as public relations (direct personal contact, booths at 
fairs, slide shows, developing educational packages for distributors and retailers, etc.), 
information sharing through monthly newsletters, conferences/workshops, marketing 
efforts, and political lobbying. In the absence of substantial support from university 
extension services and other traditional sources of agricultural information and 
assistance (Lipson 1997), these organizations used their ideological source of 
solidarity to be both repositories and disseminators of expertise of organic production 
practices. 
The degree to which OCIA engaged in ancillary functions such as educational 
outreach, information sharing, and political lobbying was eclipsed by growers’ sole  
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interest in certification. One of the founders of OCIA disappointedly recounts, “The 
OCIA concept was, Organic Crop Improvement Association. [The purpose] was to 
certify crops and improve crops. This concept was lost at day one. People came to the 
organization to become certified, not to improve crops. It was really driven by 
economics” (Interview, June 16, 2005). As such, OCIA was essentially an 
organization whose core specialization was certification. Based on interviews 
conducted, OCIA did not engage in any additional services, advocacy, or community-
awareness efforts.  
Consistent with the aims of state SBCOs to eliminate conflicts of interest 
(growers certifying growers), the state was only in the business of certification. 
Among local nonprofit SBCOs, technical assistance to farmers often went hand-in-
hand with certification. By contrast, state SBCOs were valued in the industry for their 
potential to be more objective, credible, and less prone to personal distortions. 
Table 1.2 summarizes the three forms of SBCOs, arraying them on a 
continuum from more collectivist in nature to more bureaucratic. Local nonprofit 
SBCOs are more collectivist in nature, OCIA chapters tend to fall in the middle, and 
state-run SBCOs are more bureaucratic. Having inductively developed this typology 
of SBCOs in the U.S. organic food industry from interviews and other sources of 
qualitative data, I now shift attention to questions of conditions that supported the 
presence of the various forms of SBCOs.  
As mentioned in the introduction, given that increasing attention is being paid 
to the role of audiences (i.e., critics, industry analysts, certification/accreditation 
bodies, etc.) in facilitating the emergence of particular organizational forms and 
markets, it is important to understand the origins of these audiences. Theory regarding 
the founding of organizations (Stinchcombe 1965) and the insights gained from the 
case study suggest that particular antecedent and facilitative conditions will tend to  
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foster distinct forms of SBCOs. This quantitative analysis is an effort to validate those 
claims derived from the inductive case study of SBCOs.  
TABLE 1.2: DIMENSIONS OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
  More Collectivist    More Bureaucratic 
  
  Local SBCO  OCIA   State SBCO 
Dimensions      
      
Source of Solidarity  Primarily Ideological  Primarily 
Economic 
N/A 
Authority Structure  Decentralized 
authority;  
democratic decision 
making on standards 
Centralized 
authority; 
decision making 
regarding 
standards done 
at headquarters 
All decisions 
regarding standards 
made by legislature 
and state departments 
of agriculture; often 
employed an advisory 
board 
Social Control/Relations  Growers certify 
growers 
Growers certify 
growers 
Objective and reliable 
third party 
certification  
Incentive Structure  Reliance on shared 
purpose and 
volunteer labor to 
accomplish 
organizational tasks 
and goals 
Little shared 
purpose; 
consequently, 
the use of 
volunteer labor 
was not 
sustainable 
Remunerative 
incentives  
Specialization and 
Organizational Focus 
Performed many 
tasks and functions 
beyond its stated 
purpose of 
certification  
Primary focus 
on certification 
Only performed 
certification functions 
to maintain objectivity 
and credibility 
 
Given the ideological nature of local nonprofit SBCOs, I expect that states that 
are more amenable to collectivist-democratic ideals and to anti-mass consumer and 
anti-capitalist ideas will be more likely to experience the founding of a local nonprofit 
SBCO. I would also predict that states with established organic food industry 
infrastructure would also be more likely to experience local nonprofit SBCO founding.  
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Based on the findings from the qualitative component of this research, it is reasonable 
to expect that OCIA chapters are more likely to be founded in states with larger 
agribusiness interests. Finally, given state SBCOs’ bureaucratic nature and their 
reliance on the state for financial and institutional support, it stands to reason that 
greater legal and regulatory infrastructure would be a precursor to their creation. 
Hence, I expect that states that pass more comprehensive state organic policies and 
regulation will be more likely to establish a state SBCO. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Because I focus on the differential conditions that facilitate the emergence of 
distinct SBCO forms across states and over time, the state-year is the natural unit of 
analysis. The window of observation is from 1970 to 2000. 1970 serves as the baseline 
year because it was in that year that Rodale initiated preparations for the first 
certification program. The window ends in 2000, the year that the USDA released the 
final regulations that preempted all previous state organic food laws and rules.  
Dependent variable. SBCO founding is the dependent variable. I parsed founding into 
three distinct categories: the founding of a local nonprofit SBCO, the founding of the 
first OCIA chapter in a state, and the founding of a state SBCO. These data for the 
dependent variable come from multiple sources. For a yearly compilation of all 
SBCOs in existence in the United States, I drew from the National Organic Directory 
(NOD; 1983–1984, 1986–2001), published by the Community Alliance with Family 
Farmers. I also consulted three additional directories
10 to capture all certification 
organizations that existed prior to their listing in the NOD. If directories did not list a 
founding date for the certification organization, calls were made to the organization to 
obtain it. If the organization had been dissolved, I contacted affiliated farmers or 
                                                 
10 One published by the Organic Farming Research Foundation, another by the Agricultural Marketing 
Service of the USDA, and a third by ATTRA (Appropriate Technology Transfer for Rural Areas).  
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organizations to obtain both a founding date and a dissolution date for the particular 
organization.  
Independent variables. The first set of independent variables in the model that are 
expected to predict the presence of a local nonprofit SBCO include the percentage of 
liberal voters in a state (Liberal voters) and the number of organic food wholesalers in 
a state (Wholesalers).  
I use the percentage of liberal voters in a state (Liberal voters) because states 
that had a solid left-leaning political base would be more likely to embrace the 
ideological underpinnings of local nonprofit SBCOs. The measure comes from 
Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985) and is a time-invariant measure culled from 
76,000 respondents to 48 CBS News–New York Times general population and voter 
polls at the state level from 1974 to 1982. The measure is the percentage of people 
polled in a state that described their political views or themselves as “liberal” when it 
comes to political matters.   
The wholesaler variable is drawn from the NOD and from Food Co-ops: An 
Alternative to Shopping in Supermarkets (Ronco 1975), both of which list wholesalers 
that sell natural and organically grown or produced food. The NOD provides the most 
comprehensive listing of all wholesalers carrying organically produced food from 
1983 to 1984 and 1986 to 2000. Foods Co-ops was published in 1975. Although the 
food co-op movement also included the related natural food movement, the food co-op 
movement had a symbiotic connection to the development of organic food because the 
purveyors and customers of natural food stores shared the same anti-system 
ideological underpinning of pioneering organic farmers. To develop a longitudinal 
variable from these two sources that would cover the length of the observation period, 
I first established that the two sources were similar. I compared the 1983 wholesaler 
data from the NOD with the 1974 Food Co-ops data. I found a .86 correlation between  
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the two data sources. I then interpolated the NOD data and compared the interpolated 
1974 NOD data with the 1974 Food Co-ops data and found a .75 correlation. Based on 
these correlations, I combined the Food Co-ops and the NOD data and linearly 
interpolated and extrapolated to generate values for the missing years of data.  
To assess whether OCIA arises in states with greater agribusiness interests, I 
include a proxy measure for the presence of large farms in a state (Land/farms). To 
calculate Land/farms, I divided the total amount of farmland in a given state by the 
number of farms, thus providing a measure of the average size of farm in a given state.  
Finally, the independent variable expected to influence the presence of state 
SBCOs is a measure of the number of total provisions codified in law or 
administrative rules for each state-year (Total state provisions). This provides an 
assessment of the comprehensiveness of legal structure in a state. For this measure, I 
gathered data on all organic food laws and administrative rules from the first law 
passage in 1973 through the end of the observation period. To tabulate the total 
number of provisions present in state law or state administrative rules between 1973 
and 2000, I first consulted Westlaw. While Westlaw maintains a fairly comprehensive 
historical record of all U.S. statutes, administrative laws, and amendments, I found it 
necessary to conduct archival research to find legislation predating Westlaw’s 
database. After obtaining the first appearance of organic food legislation or 
administrative rules in each state, I then coded each state-year according to the number 
of provisions that each law contained. For each mention of a new provision, the state-
year received a one for that provision; otherwise, it received a zero. I summed across 
all provisions for a total number of provisions in a given state for a given year and 
then worked forward coding changes in the law reflected in amendments.  
Control Variables. A number of agriculturally related measures that may influence 
SBCO founding dynamics are included as controls. First, I control for the total number  
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of farms in a state. Because this variable was skewed, I took the natural log and call 
this variable Number of farms. Second, I control for the change in amount of farmland 
in a state (Change in acres). I also control for the change in the number of farms in a 
state (Change in # of farms). Finally, I control for the percentage of gross state product 
that is generated through agriculture (Farm revenue/GSP). Because these data were 
not available for the first seven years of the observation period, I used the STATA 
ipolate and epolate commands. I also control for significant changes in the legal 
environment of the certification organizations. I do this by creating a variable called 
Novel provisions. This variable is a cumulative measure of the number of novel 
provisions across U.S. states. By novel, I mean a provision that has never been 
codified in law. At the national level, I also control for the total number of SBCOs in 
the United States (Cum # SBCOs). Finally, I control for the presence of other forms of 
SBCOs in a state. Unless otherwise noted, all variables were constructed from 
historical agricultural data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service of the 
USDA.  
Modeling SBCO Foundings 
I use random effects logistic regression models to assess the effects of 
independent variables on the probability of the founding of a particular form of SBCO, 
clustering on state to reduce the bias associated with pooled, cross-sectional panel 
data. I do not use fixed effects models because they are unable to estimate effects for 
panel data that include cases for which there is no variation in the dependent variable 
over time. The majority of states do not experience the founding of any one kind of 
these certification organizations. Consequently, much of the sample is lost using fixed 
effects models. Nonetheless, several robustness checks were performed, including 
logistic and complementary log-log models that clustered observations by state and  
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calculated robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity (White 1982). These 
models produced results similar to those reported here.   
RESULTS 
Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 report the summary statistics and correlations of the 
variables. Table 1.6 presents the results obtained from the SBCO analysis. Models 1 
and 2 report the results of the analysis of OCIA founding; models 3 and 4 report those 
of state SBCO founding; models 5 and 6 report those of local nonprofit SBCO 
founding. Overall, national variables such as the cumulative number of SBCOs and 
the number of novel legal provisions have a legitimating effect, encouraging the 
founding of all forms of SBCOs.  
Regarding the founding of OCIA chapters, states with greater numbers of 
farms and greater numbers of wholesalers predict the founding of OCIA chapters. 
Consistent with expectations, states dominated by larger farms (Land/farms) are more 
likely to experience OCIA-chapter founding.  
Models 3 and 4 report the results from the analysis of State SBCO founding. In 
these models, both local SBCO and OCIA chapter variables are negatively related to 
the founding of a state SBCO (and marginally significant in the case of local SBCO). 
With the exception of a few states (i.e., Washington and New Hampshire, whose local 
nonprofit SBCOs successfully petitioned the state to take responsibility for running 
certification programs), local nonprofits and OCIA chapters generally sought to retain 
their ability to certify organic producers without competition from the state. Many 
state programs, as expected, arose from decisions by state legislators and bureaucrats 
to pass laws that enabled the creation of a state certification program as demonstrated 
by the positive and significant predictor variable of Total state provisions. These types 
of state programs often arose in states with little organic infrastructure. For example, a 
state program was established in Nevada in 1998 even though only one major  
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wholesaler of organic food existed in the state at that time. This is somewhat borne out 
in the analysis, as the variable Wholesalers is a negative predictor of state programs, 
albeit not statistically significant.  
Finally, the founding of the local nonprofit form is, as expected, significantly 
and positively predicted by the variables Wholesaler and Liberal voters. It is also 
important to note that whereas the variable Land/farms is a positive and significant 
predictor of OCIA-chapter founding, it is negative and significant for the founding of 
local nonprofit SBCOs. This demonstrates that OCIA chapters were established 
largely in agribusiness-oriented states and local nonprofit SBCOs were not, providing 
initial indications that through OCIA, larger, less ideologically committed farmers 
entered into the organic market.
11  
Notably, the presence of an OCIA chapter in a state inhibits the founding of 
local nonprofit SBCOs, as does the presence of state SBCOs (dropped from models 5 
and 6 due to perfect negative predictions of local nonprofit SBCOs). In other words, 
once state SBCOs are established in states, no local nonprofit SBCOs are founded in 
those states, and once OCIA chapters are formed in states, it is unlikely that a local 
nonprofit SBCO will be founded in those same states.   
                                                 
11 Further analyses that predict the size of producer and commitment to organic ideals are needed to 
substantiate this claim.   
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TABLE 1.3: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR OCIA FORM-FOUNDING ANALYSES 
Variable  1 2 3  4  5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
1. OCIA founding                 
2.  Number  of  farms  .07              
3.  Change  in  acres  -.01  -.20             
4. Change in # farms  -.01  -.20  .51                   
5.  Farm  revenue/GSP  .00  .02  -.01  .01          
6.  Novel  provisions  .07  -.02  .04  .06  -.01         
7. Cum. # SBCOs  .08  -.17  .10  .23  -.03  .09             
8. State SBCO  .00  -.04  .04  .15  -.01  -.05  .46           
9. Local SBCO  .06  -.07  .11  .10  -.01  .11  .24  -.12         
10.  Wholesalers      .11 .16 -.04  .12  -.01  .01 .00 .01 .29      
11. Liberal voters  .00  -.42  .13  .07  -.08 -.01 -.01 -.04 .29  .24     
12.  Land/farms  .01  -.35 -.03 .09 .02  .00  -.08 -.07 -.24 -.08 .13   
13. Total state provisions  .00  .03  .01 .20  -.01  -.03  .49 .78 .00 .13 -.04  -.07 
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TABLE 1.4: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR STATE SBCO FORM-FOUNDING ANALYSES 
Variable    1 2 3  4  5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
1.  State  SBCO  founding                
2.  Number  of  farms  -.04               
3.  Change  in  acres  .02  -.14              
4. Change in # farms  .01  -.22  .33                   
5.  Farm  revenue/GSP  .00  .02  .00  .01           
6.  Novel  provisions  .09  -.01  .04  .04  -.01          
7. Cum. # SBCOs  .11  -.03  .05  .21  -.02  .06             
8.  OCIA    .02 .22 -.01  .04  .01 .02 .50          
9.  Local  SBCO  -.02  -.03  .10 .15  -.02  .05 .35 .07        
10.  Wholesalers      -.02  .15 -.08  .11  -.01  .00 .11 .10 .27      
11.  Liberal  voters  .00 -.35  .09 .10  -.08  -.01  .00 -.04  .32 .24    
12. Land/farms  .02  -.39  -.08  .10  .03  .00  -.05 -.01 -.29 -.08 .08  
13. Total state provisions  .12  .08 -.05  .13  .00 .04 .40 .27 .27 .51 .08  -.02 
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TABLE 1.5: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR LOCAL SBCO FORM-FOUNDING ANALYSES 
Variable  1 2 3  4  5 6 7 8 9  10  11 
1.  Local  SBCO  founding             
2.  Number  of  farms  .00           
3.  Change  in  acres  .02 -.10          
4. Change in # farms  .02 -.20 .39              
5.  Farm  revenue/GSP  -.01 .02 .00 .02         
6.  Novel  provisions  .10 -.01 .04 .06 -.01       
7. Cum. # SBCOs  .01 -.05 .03 .21 .00  .09        
8. OCIA   -.05 .13 -.02 .02 .02  .09 .53      
9. Wholesalers    .15 .17 -.02 .08 -.02  -.03 .01 .10    
10. Liberal voters  .07 -.37 .06 .01 -.09  -.03 -.12 -.06 .20  
11. Land/farms  -.08 -.49 -.05 .15 .02  .01 .10 .05 -.09 .22
12. Total state provisions  -.05 .09 .03 .21 .00  -.06 .53 .13 .13 -.09 .06
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TABLE 1.6: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF SBCO FORM FOUNDING 
  OCIA form  State form  Local nonprofit form 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Number  of  farms  .661**  1.159**  -.202 -.083 .074  .189 
 (.249)  (.398)  (.366)  (.259) (.162) (.215) 
Change in acres*100  .024  .077  .075  .185  .029  .033 
 (.105)  (.117)  (.222)  (.210) (.012) (.143) 
Change in # of farms*100  -.010  -.015  -.017  -.035  .002  .007 
 (.011)  (.011)  (.036)  (.026) (.012) (.017) 
Farm  revenue/GSP  .167  .238  -.821 -.177 -.082 .224 
  (.646)  (.696)  (7.085) (8.944) (.766)  (1.259) 
Novel provisions  .079+  .079+  .190**  .147*  .116**  .126** 
 (.041)  (.042)  (.062)  (.060) (.040) (.041) 
Cum. # SBCOs  .044**  .065**  .131*  .106*  .011  .049** 
 (.015)  (.017)  (.064)  (.042) (.025) (.015) 
State  SBCO  -.646  .623      
  (.870)  (1.075)      
Local SBCO  .519  .357  -1.465+  -1.356     
  (.494) (.601) (.869) (.855)    
OCIA SBCO      -.787  -1.003  -1.898  -2.411* 
      (.845) (.872) (1.174)  (1.130) 
Wholesalers   .062*    -.282    .123* 
   (.028)    (.204)    (.054) 
Liberal voters    .051    .078    .201* 
   (.083)    (.081)    (.079) 
Land/farms   .691*    -.130    -1.249** 
   (.283)    (.337)    (.481) 
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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TABLE 1.6 (Continued) 
  OCIA form  State form  Local nonprofit form 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Total state provisions    -.085+    .180**    -.117 
   (.048)    (.053)    (.076) 
Constant  -12.516**  -19.925**  -8.388* -9.752* -4.722* -10.119** 
 (2.861)  (5.454)  (3.496)  (3.940) (2.034) (3.466) 
Observations  1184 1184 1336 1336 952  952 
Log  likelihood  -105.300  -97.686 -56.059 -49.892 -116.424  -97.554  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have documented the emergence and expansion of standards-
based certification organizations (SBCOs) in the organic food industry. There are clear 
temporal and geographic patterns of SBCO founding, and I have linked SBCO 
organizational form founding to distinctive facilitating state-level conditions. The 
initial development of the organic food industry occurred in states such as California, 
Maine, and Oregon that had strong, left-leaning political bases and populations of 
farmers and consumers that promoted an anti-mass consumer, organic ideology that 
facilitated the creation of an infrastructure of organic food wholesalers. In turn, these 
states experienced the creation of local nonprofit certification organizations. As the 
organic market grew, other states, dominated by large farms and agribusiness interests, 
experienced the founding of another SBCO form—OCIA. Growers in these states 
were less driven by ideology than those in states from which the original organic 
grassroots movement emerged. Instead, they saw the organic food industry as an 
economic opportunity. The founding of OCIA chapters in several key agricultural 
states facilitated the entry of much larger farmers into the organic industry. Increased 
legislative activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s generated the impetus and legal 
machinery necessary for state departments of agriculture to establish state-run SBCOs, 
constituting a third, unique SBCO form.  
By highlighting how distinct SBCO forms took root in different states 
characterized by distinct facilitative conditions, I have sought to expand understanding 
of how conditions in different locales led to the instantiation of a set of industry 
principles and practices in distinctive organizational forms that fostered the emergence 
and growth of an industry. I have argued that the theorization and development of a set 
of standards and certification procedures by early organic pioneers served as a 
”fence”—enacting a solid boundary around organic agriculture by which consumers  
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could differentiate organically grown products from conventionally grown food. Yet 
the codification of standards and the routinization of certification procedures 
facilitated the diffusion of organic to different locales, becoming instantiated in new 
governance organizations which subsequently served as “gates” by which outsiders to 
the organic movement entered into the organic marketplace, fostering endogenous 
change in the shape and trajectory of the industry.  
An important limitation of this study should be noted. It is difficult to extricate 
ideological explanations of organizational outcomes from material explanations 
because ideology fundamentally shapes organizational behavior as it does human 
agency (Simons and Ingram 1997) and influences organizational goals, strategies, 
structures, and processes (Scott Morton and Podolny 2002; Haveman and Khaire 
2004). As such, it is hard to determine if particular SBCO forms were founded in 
states for ideological reasons, for the particular material benefits they provided to their 
clients, or both. It is possible that one form of certification organization may have 
appealed to some groups of producers more than to others. For example, OCIA-
certified producers had access to international markets that producers certified by local 
nonprofit SBCOs did not. However, access to distant, national, and international 
markets has ideological ramifications as initial organic principles valued locally grown 
and locally consumed—a tension that is currently generating a substantial amount of 
controversy and press (Brady 2006; Economist 2006). Nonetheless, extricating 
material and ideological motivations would greatly enhance theoretical understanding 
of these processes.   
Future research should pay greater attention to the role of geography in 
facilitating the emergence and transposition of unique sets of actors, institutions, 
logics, and governance structures. Extant conceptions of institutional change in 
organization theory are dominated by temporal explanations. For example, changes in  
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governance structures in industries are considered over time, but rarely across polities 
or locales (e.g., Campbell et al. 1991; Scott et al. 2000). Similarly, shifts in 
institutional logics have been conceptualized as uncontested, higher order organizing 
principles that operate historically (quantified as period effects) that homogenously 
influence organizations within a given field (e.g., Thornton 2002). Greater 
appreciation for the fragmented nature of organizational fields and institutional 
environments is needed (Meyer, Scott, and Strang 1987; Powell 1991; Schneiberg and 
Soule 2005). Biggart and Beamish point out that “conventions of coordination are 
historically developed and local, and explain why the same industry is organized 
differently in different places. Differences are the result of actors’ pragmatic attempts 
to coordinate with others over time; multiple means of coordination are possible” 
(2003:457). These conventions often become localized institutions that can inform 
higher order institutional processes. For example, state legislators relied heavily on the 
standards and certification procedures when passing state law. In turn, federal 
lawmakers and bureaucrats drew heavily upon the legal-structural elements that had 
been created and subsequently refined by state-level actors and legislatures. Hence, 
being attentive to the various localized conventions and institutions that embody 
multiple interests and logics can inform understanding of broader, field-level 
institutional change.  
Another fruitful avenue to extend this research is to more fully explore the 
antecedents and consequences of outsider incursions into markets for what Rothschild 
and Whitt (1986) refer to as “oppositional goods and services.” These oppositional 
goods and services come into existence as a result of institutional entrepreneurs that 
“see some important social need that is unfilled by conventional businesses or public 
agencies” (p. 116). These types of markets are important from a public policy 
perspective because they are often the source of substantial economic and social  
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change that can fundamentally redefine preexisting norms, practices, and institutions. 
For example, organic pioneers sought to “establish a completely new system of food 
production and distribution” (Belasco 1989:69). While not entirely achieving their 
objectives, the pioneering work of organic activists has significantly altered 
agricultural practice and consumer behavior, making organic agriculture the fastest 
growing niche in U.S. and global agricultural markets. Other examples of oppositional 
goods and services include renewable-energy technologies, microcredit, fair-trade 
products, and green building—all of which seek to alter dominant institutions and 
extant production and distribution practices in their respective fields. Tensions arise in 
these types of markets because while advocates find justification for their markets’ 
existence through their opposition to mainstream institutions and organizations, they 
must nonetheless seek support, endorsement, and legitimacy from some of those same 
institutions. Further study of how these tensions are managed is critical to more fully 
understand under what conditions broader markets for oppositional goods and services 
are successful, frustrated, co-opted, or transformed.  
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PAPER 2:  
MECHANISMS GENERATING VARIATION:  
REGULATORY CHANGE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
As a market or community of organizations grows and consumer demand 
increases for particular products or services, the state often takes an increasingly active 
role in monitoring organizations’ activities, endorsing and rewarding community 
members, and shaping the rules and standards for legitimate activities and outputs 
(Baum and Oliver 1992). The law, through instrumental as well as normative and 
cultural-cognitive means, has significant outcomes for organizational forms (Hannan 
and Freeman 1989; Fligstein 1990; Ranger-Moore, Banaszak-Holl, and Hannan 1991; 
Halliday, Powell, and Granfors 1993; Dobbin and Dowd 1997; Schneiberg 2002; 
Ingram and Rao 2004), the distribution of property rights (Campbell and Lindberg 
1990), the adoption and curtailing of practices within firms (Edelman 1990, 1992; 
Mezias 1990; Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer, and Scott 1994; Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 
1999; Kelly 2003), organizational performance (Carroll, Goodstein, and Gyenes 1988; 
Ingram and Simons 2000), and the creation and subsequent expansion of new markets 
(Dobbin 1994; Carruthers, Babb, and Halliday 2001; Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and 
Stone Sweet 2002).  
Despite insights generated through this research, the growing body of literature 
on law and markets has come under critique for its conceptualization of regulation as a 
uniform, exogenous environmental element— a “one-dimensional background 
incentive system reshaping parameters for means-ends rational calculation . . . without 
having the potential of altering the fundamental nature, goals or meaning of economic 
activity” (Stryker 2003:13). As this critique indicates, law has been operationalized in 
most studies as either a dichotomous variable (passed or not passed; e.g., Wade,  
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Swaminathan, and Saxon 1998) or as “regulatory periods” (e.g., Ranger-Moore et al. 
1991; Dobbin and Dowd 1997). Within such blunt-edged conceptualizations, variation 
that exists in the content and potential efficacy of law is not adequately accounted for. 
Nor are there clear explanations within these conceptualizations for the sources of 
regulation and how or why shifts in its content occur over time and across polities. 
To advance this literature, Stryker (2003) and Edelman and Stryker (2005) 
suggest that organizational sociologists move beyond theorizing law as an exogenous 
element to consider law and economy as “deeply embedded in social action and 
organization and linked through political and institutional mechanisms” (p. 527). 
Since relatively little is known about how organizations impact legal structure (much 
more is known about the inverse), treating law as a dependent variable is a significant 
move toward this end. However, there are a few studies that have treated law as a 
dependent variable, but these studies still generally under-specify outcomes by 
conducting formal modeling that constrains law to either or a “1” or a “0”—present or 
absent (e.g., Zhou 1993; Soule and Zylan 1997). This dichotomous operationalization 
masks much of the complexity and distinctiveness that accrues within legal code over 
time and space.
1 Without an understanding of this complexity, institutionalization is 
often uncritically cast as a 1/0 affair (Strang and Sine 2002; Schneiberg and Clemens 
2006:217). 
The foregoing study argues that disrupting the trend of analytically 
homogenizing legislation opens possibilities for understanding variation in the content 
of what is being diffused (Strang and Soule 1998) and its relationship to intra-industry 
governance organizations—an approach that “presents a rich set of questions for new 
institutionalism” (Ingram and Clay 2002:532).  
                                                 
1 For example, Zhou (1993:545) treats licensing legislation as “institutionally similar” (and thus codes it 
dichotomously); Ingram and Rao (2004) similarly consider their dependent variable as a discrete event, 
coding the imposition of greater taxes on chains dichotomously (1/0).   
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Recent work (Schneiberg and Bartley 2001; Strang and Bradburn 2001; 
Ingram and Rao 2004; Schneiberg and Soule 2005) has begun to move toward a more 
nuanced understanding of the origins, antecedents, and factors that account for 
regulation within a market. These studies advance theories of state-market relations by 
tracing the influence of particular actors and institutional processes on the enactment 
of regulation. In addition to identifying antecedents, these studies move beyond the 
dichotomous modeling of law as present/absent to differentiate between distinct types 
of regulation.
2 
I advance this research agenda here by focusing needed attention on how 
standards-based certification organizations (SBCOs)
3—key sources of industrial order 
in many industries—influence the content and evolution of state regulation. Such an 
approach is congruent with ongoing conversations in political science regarding the 
blurring of public and private governance (Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Stoker 1998; 
Pierre and Peters 2000; Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004). Although theoretical 
work has highlighted the key role that associations and standards organizations play in 
the governance of markets and industries (e.g., Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Brunsson 
and Jacobsson 2000; Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg 1991; Scott, Ruef, 
Mendel, and Caronna 2000), an understanding of the relationship between these types 
of governance organizations and the state is relatively undeveloped. In this paper, I 
consider the dynamic nature of law content, hoping to answer questions regarding 
when and under what conditions private governance organizations influence legal 
dynamics.  
                                                 
2 For instance, Schneiberg and Bartley (2001) used a competing-risks model to determine the 
antecedents of full rate-control legislation versus weaker, antidiscrimination legislation in the early fire 
insurance industry. In their study of anti-chain-store laws, Ingram and Rao (2004) modeled both the 
enactment and the repeal of legislation.  
3 By SBCO, I mean an organization whose primary purpose is to create and promote standards, verify 
the compliance of other organizations to those standards, and formally acknowledge that an 
organization has met the standards through the conferral of a certification, endorsement, or 
accreditation.   
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This question is theoretically significant for several reasons. First, there is 
limited research on the influence of private governance institutions (Ingram and Clay 
2000) such as SBCOs, particularly vis-à-vis the state. Second, with only two notable 
exceptions, which will be reviewed below (Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998; Strang 
and Bradburn 2001), studies of industry legal structures primarily consider general 
patterns of diffusion, not the specific content of laws. By accounting for patterns of 
variation in content, my study provides a more precise, nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between the state and private governance within an industry context. 
Third, to this point, the only theoretically significant, longitudinal categorization of the 
content of law (Grattet et al. 1998) has not been empirically tested, nor has it been 
applied specifically to a market/industry context. Building on this promising but still 
emergent body of work, this study takes as a point of departure the notion that 
accounting for the differential content of laws and the political processes that drive 
them is crucial to a comprehensive theory of state-market relations.  
To develop this theory, I highlight contributions from two different approaches 
that serve as starting points. One set of these studies emphasizes how organizational 
actors influence law creation and change, establishing a middle ground between overly 
structural or overly interest-based explanations of regulation. A second subset of 
studies focuses direct attention on laws, their specific provisions, and their internal 
dynamics, addressing current weaknesses in the literature that deemphasizes law as a 
phenomenon to be explained. Taken together, these studies highlight the importance of 
considering the role of organizational action and interests in impacting the content and 
trajectory of law.  
THEORY 
In counterpoint to conventional accounts of diffusion and institutional change 
that suggest that the adoption of structure and practices are driven initially by  
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perceptions of efficiency and then become legitimate and taken for granted (Tolbert 
and Zucker 1983; Zhou 1993; Grattet et al. 1998), a set of scholars are increasingly 
integrating political factors into accounts of the creation and spread of legal and 
regulatory policies and structures (Schneiberg and Bartley 2001; Schneiberg 2002; 
Ingram and Rao 2004; Edelman and Stryker 2005; Schneiberg and Soule 2005). For 
example, Schneiberg and Soule (2005) found that the institutionalization of insurance-
rate regulation among U.S. states represented a “settlement” resulting from political 
conflicts over competing models of industrial order. This settlement was a product of 
social movement mobilization and multilevel institutional processes that resulted in a 
“multiplex, fractured institutional field” (p. 152). Federated state systems allowed for 
“diverse but largely uncorrelated and relatively weak pockets of institutionalization . . 
.” and “the presence of multiple platforms and ports of entry create[ed] possibilities 
for broadly organized but competing projects, the development of institutional 
contradiction within or across levels, and the institutionalization of multiple, even 
contradictory, industrial orders” (p. 156). This research demonstrates that diffusion 
can be profoundly political and is driven by “the political dynamics of opposition, 
argumentation, contestation, and compromise” (p. 156). Such political contestation 
and its influences provide an agency and action-oriented approach to 
institutionalization in which extant institutional arrangements are viewed as 
settlements arrived at through “articulation, layering, bricolage, and recombination 
rather than homogenization or convergence” (p. 157).  
Similarly, Ingram and Rao (2004) reveal how competition between rival 
organizational forms can be manifest in broader regulative structures. Using the anti-
chain-store movement and the countermobilization by chain stores of the early 
twentieth century as a context, they demonstrate how multilevel political and 
institutional dynamics influenced the passage and repeal of state-level anti-chain-store  
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legislation. A Supreme Court ruling deeming constitutional an anti-chain-store law in 
Indiana spurred 27 additional state legislatures to enact legislation that imposed higher 
taxes on chain stores. Counter-mobilization efforts on the part of chain stores ensued. 
Chain stores fought tax legislation and sought to improve their public image through a 
collective association called the National Chain Store Association (NCSA). From their 
analysis, Ingram and Rao found that the number of independent stores and the degree 
of independent homogeneity
4 predicted the passage of anti-chain-store legislation. By 
contrast, and consistent with the counter-mobilization thesis, the number of chain 
stores prevented the enactment of such laws. This research underscores the idea that 
endorsement and support of the state is not a given nor an exogenous outcome of 
broader social and economic changes as much current research maintains. Rather, it is 
often the outcome of actions of competing organizations and broader institutional 
processes within an industry.  
Given that laws and rules are central to social order in virtually every facet of 
social life, a focus on legal structure provides a useful context to understand the 
mechanisms that generate and challenge order in organizational fields/markets. In a 
study of the British Columbia Water Act from 1914 to 2002, Jennings, Schulz, Patient, 
Gravel, and Yuan (2005) found that the evolution of water law was characterized by 
periods of incremental expansion and increased complexity that were punctuated by 
legal rule consolidation and rewriting that resulted in functionally differentiated law. 
Consolidation of BC water law transformed organically evolved, redundant legal 
structures into modern, structurally unique sets of rules that displaced particularistic 
rules with fewer, broadly applicable rules meant to cover a broad class of situations. 
Such dynamics tend to increase “the modularity of the rule system and thereby 
                                                 
4 Homogeneity in this setting refers to the degree to which independent stores within a state belonged to 
the same retail segments (e.g., druggists, shoe stores, grocers). A Herfindahl index was used to 
construct this variable.   
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facilitates independent adaptation by its parts” (Jennings et al. 2005:643). While this 
paper places needed attention on the nature and evolution of the corpus of law, it 
neglects the role of actors that may have driven and/or been served by these rule 
changes.  
Two other relevant studies focus attention on the content of law. In a study of 
the content of hate crime laws in the United States, Grattet et al. (1998) identify two 
mechanisms that contribute to variation in content across state laws: exclusivity and 
domain expansion. Exclusivity refers to the practice of adopting a law as a symbolic 
gesture (generally to appease constituencies) and leaving it unrevised even as updated 
versions appear in other states. To illustrate the mechanism of exclusivity, Grattet et 
al. point to the fact that most states passed a single hate crime law at only one point in 
time (only 8 of 33 adopted more than one type of hate crime law, and only 3 of those 8 
did so through subsequent amendments). Once this initial law was passed in most 
states, legislators remained committed to that approach and did not amend it even 
when more progressive laws were passed in other states. In the absence of updating 
laws to be consistent with contemporary trends, exclusivity contributed to overall legal 
heterogeneity.  
The second mechanism, domain expansion,
5 refers to the process by which 
initial, narrowly written statutes gave way to more expansive ones. According to 
Grattet et al. (1998), as the existence of a particular category of law becomes 
institutionalized and thus taken for granted, legislators and their constituencies are 
more apt to amend/tailor the law. In the context of hate crime law, they find that once 
the existence of such law was well established, state legislatures were able to more 
                                                 
5 Drawing from social problems literature, domain expansion refers to “increases in the ‘substantive 
territory’ (in terms of both activities and protected statuses) covered by the law and/or institutions 
positioned to construct and respond to a social problem” (Grattet et al. 1998:291). For example, Best 
(1990) describes how particular definitions of child abuse gained currency among professionals. “Child 
abuse” replaced an earlier, narrower concept of “battered child,” and the phrase “child abuse and 
neglect” was eventually favored over just “child abuse.”  
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fully elaborate on the basic form that was available for imitation. Elaboration on the 
basic theme of hate crime legislation led to increased diversity of legal content in the 
later period of diffusion. While this study develops important mechanisms to account 
for variation in legal content, it, like the water law study, fails to account for the role 
of interests in these processes.  
By contrast, Strang and Bradburn (2001) attend to both content and interests in 
a study of the content of state-level health maintenance organization (HMO) 
legislation. Before the passage of the federal HMO Act, there was high variation in the 
content of state laws. Following the passage of this federal legislation, this 
heterogeneity declined rapidly. The federal law and various model laws established by 
industry associations such as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
and the National Association of HMO Regulators provided state legislators with 
templates to guide their efforts to fashion and enact legislation in their respective 
states. Strang and Bradburn deduce that convergence upon a set of core legal 
provisions occurred due to the availability of these models, which were promoted 
through strong associational networks. Nonetheless, some elements of the state laws 
were more susceptible to political action. For example, states with more HMOs were 
more likely to pass legislation mandating “dual choice,” which provided HMOs with 
mandated access to employee groups, but were less likely to pass laws that 1) provided 
plan members a say over HMO governance; and 2) that mandated open enrollment, 
which opened plans to all people despite their insurance risk. The findings of this 
study suggest that HMOs were not the drivers of HMO policy, but their reaction to 
state law demonstrated that HMOs mobilized to amend both state and federal 
regulatory provisions to their benefit. This study is an important step in linking 
variation in law content with the configuration of interests present in organizational 
fields.  
60 
Integrating these two sets of studies, important theoretical advances are to be 
had by pursuing research that examines the role of organizational action in regulatory 
change and evolution. Based on the findings of these studies, it is plausible that intra-
industry governance organizations such as SBCOs may be important in shaping the 
dynamics of legal regulation of industries. In the following section, I introduce the 
empirical context for this study, which is then followed by hypotheses, data and 
methods, results, and conclusions.  
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
In December of 2000, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
issued binding rules to govern the organic food industry with the intent to assure 
consumers that agricultural products labeled as organic meet consistent and uniform 
standards. These rules were implemented the following spring, and the USDA granted 
a transitional period that extended to October of 2002. As part of this sweeping federal 
program, the USDA established the National Organic Program (NOP), whose purpose 
is to develop and implement national standards to govern the marketing of agricultural 
products as organically produced. NOP regulations require that agricultural products 
labeled as organic originate from farms or handling operations certified by a state or 
private agency that has been accredited by USDA.  
However, prior to the federal standards and accreditation system, a patchwork 
of SBCOs and state organic food laws
6 served as the primary source of governance 
and enforcement in the U.S. organic food industry. In 1973, Oregon passed the first 
state-level regulation, predating the federal legislation by 17 years. Drawing heavily 
on the principles, practices, and standards developed by organic grower communities 
and nascent certification programs, the Oregon 1973 regulation included a definition 
                                                 
6 For the purposes of this paper, I refer to both statutory law (law enacted by the legislative branch of 
government) and administrative law (the legally binding body of regulations, rules, and orders of 
administrative agencies in the government) when I use such terms as “law,” “regulation,” or “statutes.”   
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of “organic food”
 7 and “organically processed food”; required that organic producers 
keep records for two years; dictated that anything labeled as organic shall contain no 
more than 10 percent of the allowable residues of any pesticide or other synthetic or 
artificial substances; promulgated rudimentary livestock rules and banned the use of 
antibiotics; required that certifier contact information be on the label of the organic 
food; mandated the state to investigate reasonable reports of violations of the law; and 
included a provision that made illegal the labeling of something as organic that was 
not produced in accordance to the law. Thus, this first organic food law, while only 
two pages, codified into law key definitions, basic production rules and processes, and 
punitive measures.  
Soon after the Oregon regulation, a number of states passed organic laws—
Massachusetts in 1978 and Maine, California, and Connecticut in 1979. The 
Connecticut and Massachusetts laws were succinct, whereas those of Maine and 
California were more comprehensive in scope. California’s definition of organic 
moved beyond that of Oregon’s by including both prohibited and permitted materials 
for use in the production, harvesting, and processing of organic food products. For 
example, the law permitted the use of Bordeaux mixes, soluble kelp, lime, sulfur, 
gypsum, and soap but prohibited the use of petroleum solvents, diesel, and all other 
petroleum fractions. This list of appropriate and prohibited substances became known 
as the “materials list.” Following its initial appearance in California law, similar 
materials lists found their way into much of the subsequent regulation established in 
other states. In addition, the California law was particularly innovative in linking the 
term “organic” directly to the state code through labeling. The 1979 legislation 
required that all products marketed as organic include on their label the following 
                                                 
7 “Food which has been grown: without being subjected to pesticides, synthetic fertilizers, or other 
synthetic chemicals: in soil in which the humus content is increased only by the addition of natural 
matter: and in soil in which the mineral content is increased only by the application of natural mineral 
fertilizers of other natural matter” (Oregon 1980).  
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phrase: “Organically Grown in Accordance with Section 26569.11 of the California 
Health and Safety Code” (California 1979:3146).  
Following the passage of these early laws, a handful of Plains states, including 
North Dakota, South Dakota and Nebraska, passed organic food laws. These laws 
were more concise and had little in common with existing laws in California, Oregon, 
and Maine. Although all of these states defined organic, none required organic 
labeling to comply with state code. Verification methods were limited to state-
conducted inspections in most states. Punitive elements were scant, with the majority 
of laws only outlining a mislabeling clause.  
Pioneering a dramatically different type of law in 1985, Washington passed 
legislation that mandated the creation of a state-run organic certification program, 
initiating a move that subsequent states would follow. Texas shortly thereafter also 
established a state certification program. Although the Washington and Texas laws 
included many of the provisions common to the California and Maine laws, Texas 
added a number of novel provisions that gave the State Department of Agriculture 
clear jurisdiction over the creation and enforcement of organic standards. The 
department developed a certification program, retained the right to inspect property 
and records, and had the power to take punitive measures against violators of the law. 
Such power was manifest in the form of injunctions, revocation of certification status, 
imposition of fines, and the issuing of stop-sale orders.  
Having comprehensive models of state programs to build from, other states 
began passing organic food laws and establishing state certification organizations. 
Between 1989 and 1990, 13 states passed legislation, with 8 establishing state-run 
certification organizations. These laws differed dramatically from those established in 
the late 1970s and were more consistent with the 1988 Texas law. They all included a 
definition of “producer,” created a state label (e.g., “Idaho Certified Organic”) and  
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mandated the respective state departments of agriculture to create a certification 
program. Other common provisions included mislabeling clauses, fines, inspections by 
the state, revocation of certification status, and definitions of “processor,” 
“distributor,” and “certification.” 
Nearly all of these laws mandated the establishment of an advisory board. The 
board generally consisted of department employees, organic producers, consumers, 
and cooperative extension employees. The board assisted the director in formulating 
and carrying out the state organic program. In some cases, this board was given power 
to levy fees to ensure the continued functioning of the certification program.  
Prevalent in these laws were provisions requiring producers to register with the 
state and provisions to assure that all food labeled as organic was in compliance with 
the state code. Also present was a shift in the constitutive language of the law. The 
longer, more explicit definitions of organic found in earlier laws were either replaced 
by the term “certified organic” or supplemented with language indicating the need to 
certify products. For example, Colorado’s 1989 law defined organic as “agricultural 
products grown or produced in Colorado without the use of synthetic pesticides, 
synthetically compounded fertilizers, or synthetic growth hormones and certified by 
the department as complying with all standards and regulations established by this 
article” (Colorado 1989:1376, emphasis added). Thus, laws that redefined “organic” 
to mean “certified organic” required all food labeled as organic to be compliant with 
state code. This development coupled with the authorization to conduct certification 
equated to a significant increase in state participation in the industry.  
States with existing organic food laws also saw the period from 1989 to 1990 
as a time to revisit and amend these laws. Texas, Washington, Colorado, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, California, Oregon, Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, 
and Maine all amended their laws to update the legal language and increase the  
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comprehensiveness and efficacy of their laws. For example, in all of these states, 
idiosyncratic definitions of “organic” were supplemented with definitions that 
included “certified organic.” In the case of California, which had the most 
comprehensive organic food law at the time (with the exception of states with state-
run certification programs), amendments required certification organizations and 
producers to register with the state. They also mandated the imposition of fines for 
those who mislabeled products.  
Between 1973 and 2000, 36 states passed organic food laws. These laws 
exhibited significant variation in their content. Some states passed statutes of just one 
paragraph, whereas others exceeded 60 pages of text. Figure 2.1 shows the temporal 
patterning of state-law passage and amendments.  
HYPOTHESES 
To move beyond dichotomous conceptualizations of regulatory structure that 
tend to dominate diffusion and institutional literatures (Strang and Soule 1998), I focus 
on mechanisms that generate variation in legal content. Content variation is an 
important topic of study because it allows assessment of the degree of 
convergence/divergence of regulatory structures across polities. Further, it permits 
more accurate mapping of particular legal content to specific field-level interests 
(Strang and Bradburn 2001). I focus on two key mechanisms responsible for variation 
in law content. The first mechanism is regulatory inertia. By regulatory inertia, I refer 
to regulation that is passed but is then left unrevised even as more efficacious or 
legitimate versions of similar regulation exist in other states.
8 Therefore, as laws 
change over time, those states that do not update their laws contribute to overall legal 
heterogeneity.  
                                                 
8 Regulatory inertia is similar to Grattet et al.’s (1998) concept of exclusivity.  
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FIGURE 2.1: NUMBER OF ORGANIC FOOD LAWS AND AMENDMENTS 
PASSED, 1970–2000 
A second mechanism that can contribute to legal heterogeneity in a 
comparative analysis is regulatory elaboration. By regulatory elaboration,
9 I refer to 
the refinement or expansion of existing legal structure. Legal elaboration occurs 
through formal legislative amendment or through bureaucratic rule processes. Legal 
elaboration is an important element of legal evolution because it represents efforts to 
clarify extant regulation and/or expand the scope and efficacy of existing rules. Such 
efforts are generally driven by interested parties with sufficient resources to instigate 
change, or alternatively, by crises that require the state to revisit previously mandated 
regulation.  
                                                 
9 Regulatory elaboration is similar to Grattet et al.’s (1998) concept of domain expansion. 
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While both inertia and elaboration mechanisms work against conformity and 
standardization of regulation across states, past research suggests they do so for 
contrasting reasons that function as a result of temporal differentiation. In their study 
of hate crime legislation, Grattet et al. (1998) find that inertia occurred in the early 
history of hate crime laws because states did not yet have a dominant model to look to 
when crafting legislation. By contrast, elaboration occurred later because once the 
general principles of the legislation were in place, legislators were freer to expand the 
domain of hate crime law to include broader conceptions of what constituted a hate 
crime and what groups received protected status under the law. Based on their 
findings, the authors conclude that timing is everything: “the content of a state’s law is 
contingent upon when it enters the ongoing institutionalization process” (Grattet et al. 
1998:303). I examine this conclusion and the conceptual/predictive power of 
regulatory inertia and elaboration in the context of organic food industry law. The first 
hypothesis I propose is to assess if inertia and elaboration occur in a similar temporal 
fashion in the U.S. organic food industry as was found in the context of hate crime 
legislation. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 1: Regulatory inertia in state organic food laws will occur during 
the early period of industry law passage. Regulatory elaboration will occur in 
the later period.  
 
According to Grattet et al. (1998), timing should explain the occurrence of 
regulatory inertia and elaboration. However, I posit that timing may not be the primary 
factor in determining differential content of law. As a host of scholars suggest 
(Schneiberg and Bartley 2001; Strang and Bradburn 2001; Schneiberg 2002; Ingram 
and Rao 2004; Schneiberg and Soule 2005), organized interests play a central role in  
67 
shaping regulatory structures. More specifically, Strang and Bradburn (2001) have 
shown how interests have impacts on the differential content of the law itself.  
As noted in the previous paper, SBCOs were central to the development of the 
organic food industry because they created and promulgated standards, verified 
growers’ compliance with those standards, and then provided a certification or 
endorsement to compliant growers. The development of these key conventions 
decreased the information asymmetries between producer and consumer regarding 
product quality (Akerlof 1970) and facilitated the rationalization of the nascent market 
for organic products, moving it from a “movement” to an “industry.”  
SBCOs generally rely on normative pressure and incentives to get other 
organizations to adopt and subsequently adhere to their standards (Brunsson and 
Jacobsson 2000). To preserve their normative power, they tend to avoid efforts by the 
state to control their affairs. For example, when federal legislation was a possibility in 
the early 1990s, one local nonprofit SBCO reported being wary of the “possibility of 
government agencies taking over certification” and adamantly maintained that “any 
organic legislation should allow for the presence of private certification organizations” 
(Sills 1989:11). This local SBCO formed a committee to “study the possible 
appropriate changes in the state law and form a consensus about our role in federal 
legislation” (Sills 1989:11).  
While SBCOs tend to avoid being controlled by the state, SBCOs nonetheless 
frequently seek to influence and control state policies (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000; 
Sassen 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1996) in order to limit intrusive state intervention 
and to preserve and enhance their own normative power within their respective field of 
influence. Further, SBCOs, like industry associations and other collective actors, can 
be influential in the regulatory process because legislatures and state agencies tend to 
rely on industry groups for expertise, information, and, in the case of agencies, for  
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personnel to carry out their duties (Breyer 1982; Yeager 1990; Edelman and Stryker 
2005). SBCOs in particular can exert substantial influence because of their pre-
existing intra-industry governance mechanisms that can easily serve as models for 
state legislation.  
Despite ostensible justification for participation in influencing the construction 
of regulatory infrastructure, not all SBCOs engage in efforts to shape state-level 
regulatory structure. Recent calls to explain sources of heterogeneity in organizational 
fields (Lounsbury and Ventresca 2002; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006) suggest that 
disaggregating organizational forms into more distinct categories may reveal much 
regarding their resource mobilization potential, fundamental differences in ideologies, 
and the scope and/or focus of distinct organizational forms. Understanding these 
subtle differences can shed light on the degree to which organizational forms can 
succeed in achieving higher order institutional outcomes.  
In the context of the U.S. organic food industry, I argue that certain SBCOs 
exhibited features and proclivities that allowed them to serve broader purposes beyond 
core functions associated with certification and made them more likely to be interested 
in fostering state-level regulatory infrastructure. I maintain that these two factors had 
implications for the regulatory dynamics of the states in which they were located.  
In the previous paper, I arrayed SBCOs along five key dimensions (source of 
solidarity, authority structure, social control/relations, incentive structures, and 
specialization) that highlighted salient differences in the degree to which SBCOs could 
be classified as more collectivist or more bureaucratic in orientation. Local nonprofit 
SBCOs tended to maintain a shared ideology that served as a primary means of 
cohesion and commitment manifest in the use of volunteer labor to accomplish 
organizational goals and day-to-day tasks. This facilitated the ability to engage in 
collective behavior that would benefit the organic market as a whole. Such ideological  
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commitment is noted as a key element of solidarity within business groups 
(Granovetter 2005). Further, local nonprofit SBCOs were more likely to have control 
over local institutions, to make decisions that would affect the behavior of local 
organizations, and to redress conflict within the community rather than resort to an 
extra-local organization to resolve the issue. Furthermore, local nonprofit SBCOs and 
their members were generally focused on state and local marketing outlets for their 
products. Finally, these organizations engaged in various activities such as the creation 
and distribution of monthly newsletters, hosting conferences, and giving on-site 
workshops that enhanced their ability to mobilize and lobby for organic food laws. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that certification organizations, recognizing the need for 
regulation, initiated most of the early organic food laws (California Action Network 
1989). For example, in California, CCOF wrote the 1990 legislation and worked 
closely with Assemblyman Sam Farr (D-Monterey) to pass it into law (Brammer 
1989). In an editorial in the CCOF newsletter, a retailer of organic food reflected upon 
the political power that CCOF had developed: 
I think the work CCOF has done for this legislation produces benefits much 
more valuable than the legislation itself. CCOF has positioned itself and the 
California organic trade as a player in Sacramento. It has made political 
connections and won some respect. It has opened up lines of communication 
with CDFA and has clearly identified CDHS’ lack of desire to serve the 
organic trade. With more money and support from other sectors in the 
California organic trade, we will be able to exercise some political muscle in 
the coming years and make real changes. (Fishman 1989)  
Interviews with local nonprofit SBCO members and employees revealed 
similar efforts by SBCOs to participate in both the writing and passage of state organic 
food laws. For example, the Maine Organic Farmers and Gardeners Association 
(MOFGA) actually wrote Maine’s first organic labeling law. MOFGA played a central 
role in writing the subsequent amendments following the initial law passage 
(Interview, January 17, 2002). Given their mobilization capacity generated through  
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shared ideology, past organizational experience, and existing infrastructure, and their 
focus on local markets, I posit:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: States with local nonprofit SBCOs will be more likely to 
experience regulatory elaboration.  
Hypothesis 2b: States with local nonprofit SBCOs will be less likely to 
experience regulatory inertia. 
 
In contrast to local nonprofit SBCOs’ bottom-up approach, chapters of the 
nationally federated certification organization, OCIA, were founded largely through a 
top-down process in which OCIA employees actively recruited conventional farmers 
into organic markets. Unlike their local nonprofit counterparts, OCIA members were 
interested primarily in certification and the economic gains to be had from growing 
organic. Consequently, they had less of an ideological component motivating their 
membership and actions in the marketplace, decreasing their potential mobilization 
capacity. In addition, OCIA chapters focused on national and international markets 
(outside the jurisdictional boundaries of state governments), which made them 
presumably less affected by and less interested in state-level legislation.
10 
Consequently, OCIA members left state-level political lobbying to other players in the 
growing industry. When asked about OCIA’s role in lobbying for state legislation, a 
past director of OCIA said, “OCIA was interested, but they really didn’t guide the 
chapters in that respect. They would tell the chapters that you should do this [lobby for 
legislation] but they really didn’t supply guidance.” She indicated that OCIA members 
                                                 
10  This is similar to Ingram and Rao’s (2004) finding that chain stores (national organizations with 
national interests) sought influence through the Supreme Court, whereas independent stores, with their 
relatively limited resources and organization, pursued a strategy that targeted public opinion and state 
legislatures. While OCIA and local nonprofits were not directly in conflict in the same way the 
independent and national chains were over anti-chain-store legislation, they were similar with regard to 
their strategies and capabilities.   
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were largely indifferent to lobbying for state legislation: “. . . Most of them [the 
farmers] said, ‘I just want to farm my fields’” (Interview, July 23, 2004). An 
informant from Ohio corroborated this finding, suggesting that while OCIA was not 
active in lobbying for a state organic food law, the local certification organization, the 
Ohio Ecological Food and Farm Association (OEFFA), was the driving force behind 
its passage. 
As such, I posit that OCIA’s influence on state-level laws would tend toward 
inertia—if a law is passed in a state dominated by OCIA, I would expect it to be 
revisited with less frequency. According to this line of reasoning, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: States with OCIA chapters will be less likely to experience 
regulatory elaboration.  
Hypothesis 3b: States with OCIA chapters will be more likely to experience 
regulatory inertia. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Given that the United States is a fragmented state structure (Meyer and Scott 
1983), U.S. states have historically been the sites of substantial legal, political, and 
economic activity that results in geographically distinct institutions, governance 
structures, meaning systems, and practices (Markusen 1985, 1987; Saxenian 1994). 
Because I focus on the relationship between SBCOs and legal structure across states 
and over time, the state-year is the natural unit of analysis for this study. The window 
of observation is from 1970 to 2000. 1970 serves as the baseline year because it was in 
that year that Rodale initiated preparations for the first certification program. The 
window ends in 2000, the year that the USDA released the final regulations that 
preempted all previous state organic food laws and rules.   
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Dependent Variables. Data for the dependent variables in this study are drawn from all 
state organic food laws and administrative rules from the first law passage in 1973 
through the end of the observation period in 2000. I first consulted Westlaw to obtain 
all legal code in all states related to organic food production between 1973 and 2000. 
While Westlaw maintains a fairly comprehensive historical record of all states’ legal 
statutes, administrative laws, and amendments, I found it necessary to conduct 
archival research to access legislation predating Westlaw’s database. After obtaining 
all organic food legislation/administrative law (and subsequent amendments) for each 
state, I coded each state-year according to the number of provisions that each law 
contained.
11 For each mention of a new provision, the state-year received a one for 
that provision, otherwise, zero. See Appendix A for a list of all provision categories. 
This vector of 1 and 0s became the basis for the dependent variable Legal variation. 
Because a vector of over 100 provisions is unwieldy for analysis, I used the 
vector to generate a similarity score for each state. To do so, I first established a 
baseline from which to compare all state-years. This baseline was the first law passed 
(Oregon 1973). To compute similarity of all other state-years to the Oregon 1973 law, 
I used the Sorenson-Dice binary-based similarity measure (Dice 1945):  
c b a
a
+ + 2
2
 
                                                 
11  Issues of intercoder reliability are important to consider when coding messages and textual artifacts 
(Neuendorf 2002). However, intercoder reliability is markedly more important for latent, rather than 
manifest, content because with latent content, coders must make subjective judgments and 
interpretations based on their own mental schema (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 1999). Legal 
regulation is manifest content because regulatory language seeks to be as plain as possible by defining 
key terms, clearly stating the obligations and rights of persons affected, and delineating key elements of 
compliance. As such, it is substantively much easier to code than latent ideas present in conversations 
or in newspaper stories. Therefore, I alone coded all data, taking care to capture all provisions in all 
state regulation. To do this, I began with one state law and coded all regulatory elements. I then coded a 
second piece of legislation. If the second had new provisions, I created a new category for that 
provision and went back and checked the first law for the new provision. Once I had reviewed all 
legislation for all states (and all subsequent amendments), and exhausted the number of possible 
provisions across state-years, I then re-read all statutes once more to check for any miscoding that may 
have occurred in earlier statutes read.  
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where a is the co-occurrence of a provision in both laws; b is the presence of a 
provision in the Oregon 1973, but not in the other state-year being compared to the 
baseline; and c is the inverse (presence of a provision in the state-year being 
compared, but not present in the Oregon 1973 year). The Sorenson-Dice measure is in 
a class of similarity measures that do not consider negative co-occurrences.
12 As 
apparent from the measure, Sorenson-Dice weights positive co-occurrences of 
provisions, which in the case of organic food laws is favorable because it emphasizes 
the active inclusion in a law.  
The raw similarity measure calculated for each state-year thus shows how 
much a given state in year t deviates from the original vector of provisions in the 
Oregon 1973 law.
13 Instead of inferring inertia by simply considering which states 
passed one law but then never altered that law (Grattet et al. 1998), I develop a more 
complex measure that takes into account legal content variation among all states on a 
temporal basis. To construct this measure, I calculated the mean similarity score for all 
laws by year for each year of the observation window. I then subtracted each state’s 
similarity score in year t from the mean similarity score for all states in year t. A 
higher value (values ranged from .27 to -.37) for a particular state-year set of 
provisions means it is less similar to the Oregon 1973 law than the overall mean for 
that year. Conversely, a lower value means that a particular state-year configuration of 
provisions is more similar to the Oregon 1973 law than the overall mean for that year. 
For example, in 2000, Montana had a similarity score of .6; it was the state most 
similar to Oregon 1973 for that year. However, the overall mean for 2000 was .23. 
Thus, Montana in 2000 deviated from the yearly mean score in 2000 by .37. In 
contrast to Montana 2000, the opposite condition exists for Nebraska 1986. Nebraska 
                                                 
12 In a study of molecular markers, the Sorenson-Dice coefficient was found to be an effective and 
efficient measure, prompting the authors to suggest its use for practical applications (Duarte, Santos, 
and Melo 1999). 
13 Because Oregon 1973 was used as the baseline, I excluded Oregon from the data set.  
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passed a law in 1986, with the similarity score being .13. As such, Nebraska was quite 
different from Oregon 1973. In 1986, the mean similarity score for all states was .40, 
suggesting that the overall mean of all state similarity measures for 1986 was closer to 
the Oregon 1973 law than was Nebraska’s. Consequently, the Nebraska 1986 law 
deviated from the 1986 mean by .27.  
Because I am interested in the degree to which a state is inertial in its state law 
content for a given year, I take the absolute value of the difference between the mean 
similarity score for all states at year t and the similarity score for each state at year t. 
This yields a dependent variable capable of capturing individual state deviation from 
the yearly mean in either direction (+ or -). Thus, the dependent variable, once the 
absolute value is taken, ranges from 0 to .37. 
To analyze Legal variation, I used a linear regression model. Because the data 
set consists of multiple state observations, observations are not independent, violating 
a core assumption of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. As such, these data are 
prone to serial and cross-sectional autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. To correct 
for these problems, I use the xtreg command with the fixed effects option in Stata 9 to 
model the dependent variable Legal variation. Because the dependent variable ranges 
from 0 to .37 and is truncated, tobit analyses were conducted and resulted in identical 
results as reported here. 
To assess the degree of regulatory elaboration, I operationalized the second 
dependent variable in this study as the number of amendments passed. Amendments to 
the law such as renumbering or making cosmetic changes to the entire code are 
excluded from the analysis. Any states that had not passed an organic food law are 
also excluded from the analysis. Given the large amount of zeros present in the data, I 
use a zero-inflated negative binomial model using the zinb estimation procedure in 
Stata 9. Because there are multiple observations for the same state in the analysis, I  
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correct for the possible violation of independence among observations by calculating 
the standard errors of coefficient estimates using a robust clustering technique, 
clustering on state (White 1982). Both dependent variables are updated annually to 
account for any change in laws. 
Independent Variables. The primary independent variables of interest are the type and 
presence of SBCOs. For data on certification organizations, I consulted multiple 
sources. For a yearly compilation of all certification organizations in existence in the 
United States, I drew from the National Organic Directory (NOD; 1983–1984, 1986–
2001), published by the Community Alliance with Family Farmers. I also consulted 
three additional directories
14 to capture all certification organizations that existed prior 
to their listing in the NOD. If directories did not list a founding date for the 
certification organization, calls were made to the organization to obtain it. If the 
organization had been dissolved, I contacted affiliated farmers or organizations to 
obtain both a founding date and a dissolution date for the particular organization. 
Based on these data-gathering techniques, I am confident that I captured all 
certification organizations that had existed during our observation period. To indicate 
the presence of a local nonprofit SBCO in any given state-year, I simply use a 
dichotomous variable (1 present, 0 absent).  
Control Variables. To rule out alternative explanations for inertia and elaboration, I 
control for a host of variables that may influence these legal dynamics. First, I control 
for a number of agricultural-related measures such as the total number of farms in a 
state (logged) (Number of farms), the change in the number of farms (Change # 
farms), and the percentage of state GSP that is generated through agriculture (Farm 
revenue/GSP). I also control for the degree to which a state’s agricultural production is 
concentrated in larger farms (Farmland/farms). For this measure, I divide the total 
                                                 
14 One published by the Organic Farming Research Foundation, another by the Agricultural Marketing 
Service of the USDA, and the third by ATTRA (Appropriate Technology Transfer for Rural Areas).  
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amount of agricultural farmland in a state by the total number of farms. These data 
come from the National Agricultural Statistics Service of the United States 
Department of Agriculture. 
I also control for state SBCOs (State SBCO) because they spawned many 
amendments as they adapted legal and regulatory structure to better suit their needs. I 
also control for the number of organic wholesalers (Wholesalers) given that they had 
substantial interest in the governance arrangements of the industry and played a key 
brokerage function between farms and retail outlets in the marketing channels of 
organic food.
15 Given that the broader public may influence law passage, I include a 
control for the percentage of liberal voters in a state (Liberal voters). This measure 
comes from Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985) and is a time-invariant measure 
culled from 76,000 respondents to CBS News–New York Times polls at the state level 
between 1974 and 1982.  
I also control for party strength at the state legislative level. Political scientists 
have shown that party strength can facilitate or impede the passage of particular kinds 
of laws (Brown 1995; Peterson 1995). Because the organic food movement was 
aligned with environmental and counterculture movements in the 1960s and 1970s, I 
control for the degree to which Democrats control state legislatures (Percent 
democrat). Because the percentage of senate seats occupied by Democrats is highly 
collinear with the percentage of house seats occupied by Democrats (.88), I include the 
                                                 
15 These data are from the NOD and Foods Co-ops: An Alternative to Shopping in Supermarkets (Ronco 
1975), both of which list wholesalers that sell natural and organically grown or produced food. The 
NOD provides the most comprehensive listing of all wholesalers carrying organically produced food 
from 1983 to 1984 and from 1986 to 2000. Foods Co-ops was published in 1975. To develop a 
longitudinal variable from these two sources that would cover the length of our observation period, I 
first established that the two sources were similar. I compared the 1983 wholesaler data from the NOD 
with the 1974 Food Co-ops data. I found a .86 correlation between the two data sources. I then 
interpolated the NOD data and compared the interpolated 1974 NOD data with the 1974 Food Co-ops 
data and found a .75 correlation. Based on these correlations, I combined the Food Co-ops and the NOD 
data and linearly interpolated and extrapolated to generate values for the missing years of data.  
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percentage for the Senate. These data were collected from the Statistical Abstract of 
the United States. 
I also include a measure of the cumulative number of laws passed (# states 
w/law) to control for broader institutional processes of mimicry and learning 
(Haveman 1993; Haunschild and Miner 1997; Strang and Soule 1998). Finally, in the 
analysis of legal variation, I include the number of amendments passed (Amendments). 
I also control for the proportion of states in each state’s agricultural region that have 
passed an organic food law (% regional states w/law). To construct this variable, I rely 
on the USDA-designated farm regions. All variables in all analyses were lagged one 
year. 
RESULTS 
To evaluate hypothesis 1, that regulatory inertia occurs during the early period 
of industry law and regulatory elaboration occurs in a later period, I draw attention to 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2, which plot the number of laws and amendments passed over the 
time period of the study and show box plots of similarity scores for the years 1979 to 
2000, respectively. Figure 2.1 reveals, consistent with predictions from institutional 
theory (if one simply considers a 1/0 adopt/not adopted dichotomy), a global trend of 
institutionalization within the industry with regard to state law. Looking at the entire 
United States, law passage followed a typical “s-curve” that characterizes most 
diffusion patterns. The same table shows the cumulative number of amendments 
passed over the same time period. As law passage slows down in the early 1990s, 
amendments, which were well below 10 in the first 20 years of the observation period, 
increase monotonically over the course of the last 10 years of the observation period. 
This pattern suggests that regulatory elaboration did indeed occur in the latter period 
of the study. Once a “basic” law was in place, states tended to amend their respective  
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laws in the later period of the study, elaborating and expanding institutional structure 
and control mechanisms.  
With regard to regulatory inertia, Table 2.1 lists all states that passed a law 
without ever amending it. As demonstrated, only one (Massachusetts) of the first five 
states to pass an organic food law never amended it. In contrast to Grattet et al.’s 
(1998) prediction that regulatory inertia would occur early on in the period of law 
passage, 64 percent of exclusive law passage (as they defined it) occurs in the last 
third of the observation period; 93 percent of exclusive law passage occurs in the last 
half of the observation period.  
TABLE 2.1: STATES PASSING A LAW AND 
NO SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS  
State Year
Massachusetts 1978
Nebraska 1986
South Dakota  1988
Wisconsin 1988
Ohio 1989
Rhode Island  1990
Vermont 1990
Virginia 1990
Indiana 1993
North Carolina  1993
Pennsylvania 1994
Georgia 2000
Michigan 2000
Missouri 2000
Mean=1991; s.d.=6.1 years 
 
Employing the similarity index, Figure 2.2 provides an alternative perspective 
on inertia. Defining inertia as deviation from the yearly mean of similarity, a different 
pattern emerges.  
Box plots are particularly useful for exploring questions of variation because 
they provide information about the median, the interquartile range (capturing the  
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middle 50% of the values), the extreme values within 3/2*IQR, and outliers that lie 1.5 
times beyond the IQR. As apparent in Figure 2.2, the IQR from 1979
16 to 1987 is quite 
large, suggesting a fair amount of variation within those yearly averages of the 
similarity score. For instance, in 1979, Massachusetts and Connecticut had scores of 
.31 and .30, respectively, whereas Maine and California were much more similar to 
the Oregon 1973 law, with similarity scores of .62 and .56, respectively. The median 
score sinks dramatically in 1985 with laws in New Hampshire and Washington 
differing radically from the other existing laws at the time. Between 1987 and 1990, 
the median score again falls substantially. From 1990 on, the national mean similarity 
score varies little, with a high in 1992 of .265 to a low of .231 by 2000. While the IQR 
is getting smaller, the whiskers become elongated over time and outliers appear, 
suggesting that while the majority of states are converging within the IQR, there are 
others that are introducing variation in two ways. First, consistent with the mechanism 
of regulatory inertia, variation enters through the passage of a law that is similar to 
Oregon 1973 but is never amended (represented by the upper whiskers and outliers in 
Figure 2.2), despite ongoing change to the national mean similarity measure. Second, 
heterogeneity may enter through the passage of a law (represented by the lower 
whiskers and outlier in Figure 2.2) that diverges significantly from OR 1973 and from 
the yearly mean. It should also be noted that the majority of states that pass 
amendments fall within the IQR (59% are passed by states that fall within the IQR; 
13% are passed by states below the 25th percentile; 29% are passed by states with 
similarity scores above the 75th percentile).  
From these graphical analyses, I conclude that hypothesis 1 is partially 
supported. Regulatory inertia certainly exists in state-level organic food regulation, but 
it does not necessarily occur in the early period of the observation window as it did in 
                                                 
16 There is no box plot shown for 1978 because Massachusetts and Oregon were the only states that had 
any organic regulation to that point. In 1978, Massachusetts has a similarity score of .18.   
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the context of hate crime legislation. With regard to regulatory elaboration, there is 
evidence that individual states are expanding their laws in the later period of law 
passage, but the states passing amendments generally fall within the yearly IQR, 
suggesting that regulatory elaboration occurs for states but that regulatory elaboration 
does not necessarily result in greater legal variation.  
 
FIGURE 2.2: BOXPLOTS OF SIMILARITY SCORES, BY YEAR 
I now turn to the remaining hypotheses that consider the impact of SBCOs on 
regulatory elaboration and regulatory inertia. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the descriptive 
statistics and correlations between the variables used in the analyses. Table 2.4 
presents the results of the legal variation analysis. It should be reiterated here that the 
dependent variable is the absolute value of the similarity score of each state in year t 
less the mean similarity score for year t. In other words, a high value is equivalent to 
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deviation in either direction from the mean for that year. Model 1 contains the control 
variables. States with state SBCOs are less likely to deviate from yearly national mean 
similarity scores. This is also true of states with higher percentages of Democrats in 
the senate and greater numbers of wholesalers. As the number of organic food laws 
increase, individual states’ laws are less likely to diverge from the mean similarity 
measure, suggesting general convergence. By contrast, states with larger farms 
(Farmland/farms) are more likely to have laws that deviate from the yearly mean. This 
holds true for states located in farm regions that have higher percentages of states that 
have passed laws previously.  
Model 2 adds the SBCO variables. Consistent with hypothesis 2b, states with 
local nonprofit SBCOs are less likely to have laws that deviate from the national mean 
for year t, although this variable is marginally significant. However, hypothesis 3b is 
strongly supported, with OCIA, the federated SBCO, leading to increased variation 
from the national mean for year t. These findings support the contention that SBCO 
infrastructure significantly influences the dynamics of legal variation across time and 
space.  
Table 2.5 presents the results from the analysis total amendments. Model 3 
contains the control variables. In this analysis, state SBCOs and states with greater 
numbers of wholesalers are more likely to pass amendments. It should be noted that 
these two variables positively predict regulatory elaboration and negatively predict 
deviations from the national yearly mean of similarity. This suggests that in states 
where state SBCOs operate and where there are greater numbers of wholesalers, there 
will be greater regulatory elaboration and greater congruence with these states’ laws 
and the national yearly similarity average. This makes sense given that the state uses 
its legislative and regulative machinery to operate its state SBCO. Wholesalers, as 
critical linking pins between SBCOs and consumer markets, encouraged greater  
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regulation as key brokers who sought to decrease information asymmetries regarding 
product quality and to decrease coordination costs across state boundaries through 
streamlining certification and regulation. 
Model 4 includes the SBCO variables. Hypotheses 2a and 3a are both 
supported, with local nonprofit SBCOs being strong predictors of legal amendments 
and OCIA being a strong negative predictor of legal amendments.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to shed light on how legal dynamics within one 
industry context unfold over time and across polities. While recent work has made 
significant gains in understanding how and under what conditions political and 
institutional factors influence the passage (and repeal) of state laws, questions of legal 
variation and other important legal dynamics such as amendment processes have been 
largely neglected. Nonetheless, an “appreciation of heterogeneity and the relative 
incoherence of fields is crucial . . . for empirical explorations of institutional change” 
(Schneiberg and Clemens 2006:210). 
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TABLE 2.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR REGULATORY INERTIA ANALYSIS 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13 
1.  Similarity  .10  .08               
2.  State  SBCO  .30  .46  -.23              
3. Percent Democrat  .55  .15  .02  .07             
4. Wholesalers  6.49  17.74  -.12  -.09  -.02            
5. Change # farms  14.22  1454.47  .01  .14  -.03  .07           
6. Farm revenue/GSP  .02  .03  -.08  -.19  -.28  -.07  -.17          
7. Farmland/farms  .66  .84  -.02  .03  -.25  -.07  -.01  .26         
8. Change in acres  -100.00  438.67  .03  .06  .12  -.10  .21  -.02  -.19        
9. Number of farms (ln)  10.01  1.41  -.01  -.03  -.08 .23 .07 .33 -.13  -.04           
10. # states w/law  27.68  8.77  -.09  .27  -.16 .02 .07 -.01 .11 -.02 .10         
11. % regional states w/law  .63  .19  -.11  .28 -.15 .16 .19 .09 .12 -.02 .10 .59       
12. Amendments  .13  .40  -.10 .26 -.02 .10 .11 -.07 .00 -.07 .04 .04 .16     
13. Local nonprofit SBCO  .46  .50  .18  -.40  .10 .24 -.02 -.37 -.45 .06 .03 -.20  -.24 .01   
14.  OCIA  .33  .47  .02 -.30 -.22 .04 -.11 .46 .22 -.08 .40 .21 .08 -.12  -.06  
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TABLE 2.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR REGULATORY ELABORATION ANALYSIS 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13 
1.  Amendments  .74  3.33               
2.  State  SBCO  .30 .46  .22              
3.  Liberal  voters  20.45  4.14  .02  -.11             
4. Percent Democrat  .55  .15  .05  .07  .31            
5. Wholesalers  6.90  17.93  .03  -.10  .26  -.02           
6. Change # farms  43.99  1448.54  .07  .13  -.07  -.03  .07          
7. Farm revenue/GSP  .02  .02  -.01  -.19  -.49  -.27  -.08  -.15         
8. Farmland/farms  .64  .80  .07  .05  -.14  -.25  -.07  .00  .27        
9. Change in acres  -98.85  443.35  -.05  .06 .01 .12  -.09 .23  -.01  -.20           
10. Number of farms (ln)  10.03  1.37  .02  -.03 -.30 -.10  .24  .08  .33 -.11 -.03         
11. # states w/law  27.55  9.20  .03  .29  -.23  -.17 .03 .04 .02 .12  -.01 .08       
12. % regional states w/law  .63  .19  .04  .26  -.20  -.16 .17 .19 .11 .13 -.02  .11  .61     
13. Local nonprofit SBCO  .49  .50  -.03  -.46  .39  .10  .23 -.04 -.36 -.45  .06  .04 -.27 -.25   
14.  OCIA  .32  .47 -.06 -.28 -.18 -.22  .03 -.16  .51  .25 -.09  .38 .21 .06  -.11  
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TABLE 2.4: REGULATORY INERTIA ANALYSIS, BY STATE (GENERALIZED 
LEAST SQUARES FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION MODELS) 
    
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
    
State SBCO  -.025**  -.028** 
 (.008)  (.008) 
Percent Democrat  -.091**  -.083** 
 (.031)  (.031) 
Wholesalers -.001**  -.001** 
 (.000)  (.000) 
Change # farms  .000  .000 
 (.000)  (.000) 
Farm revenue/GSP  .325  .371 
 (.234)  (.232) 
Farmland/farms .083**  .077** 
 (.024)  (.024) 
Change in acres  .000  .000 
 (.000)  (.000) 
Number of farms (ln)  .004  .021 
 (.045)  (.045) 
# states w/law  -.002**  -.002** 
 (.000)  (.000) 
% regional states w/law  .119**  .123** 
 (.028)  (.028) 
Amendments -.001  .000 
 (.005)  (.005) 
Local nonprofit SBCO    -.013+ 
   (.007) 
OCIA     .020** 
   (.007) 
Constant .038  -.130 
 (.465)  (.465) 
Observations 419  419 
Number of states  35  35 
R-squared .17  .19 
Standard errors in brackets.  
Note: Liberal voters variable dropped due to time invariance. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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TABLE 2.5: REGULATORY ELABORATION ANALYSIS, COUNT OF 
AMENDMENTS, BY STATE (ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL 
MODELS) 
    
Variable  Model 3  Model 4 
    
State SBCO  3.190** 4.576** 
  (.504) (.831) 
Liberal voters  .027 .016 
  (.090) (.077) 
Percent Democrat  1.401 1.481 
  (2.138) (2.298) 
Wholesalers  .025** .022* 
  (.009) (.009) 
Change # farms  .000 .000* 
  (.000) (.000) 
Farm revenue/GSP  18.43 58.883** 
  (15.926) (15.131) 
Farmland/farms  -.119 .696* 
  (.226) (.286) 
Change in acres  -.001** -.001** 
  (.000) (.000) 
Number of farms (ln)  -.081 -.037 
  (.301) (.300) 
# states w/law  -.099* -.026 
  (.039) (.044) 
% regional states w/law  2.859 -.112 
  (2.393) (1.935) 
Local nonprofit SBCO   3.321** 
   (.804) 
OCIA    -1.662* 
   (.695) 
    
Constant  -2.246 -5.961+ 
  (3.260) (3.401) 
Log pseudo likelihood  -237.654 -231.565 
Wald test Χ
2  52.43 64.82 
Degrees of freedom  11 13 
Note: n=411. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Moving beyond dichotomous conceptualizations of industry legal 
infrastructure by focusing on processes that generate variation in legal content and 
amendments to preexisting laws, I have sought to provide a broader conceptualization 
of regulatory evolution, opening theoretical and empirical opportunities to more fully 
understand institutional change. To do this, I have modified explanations of two key 
processes that work against homogenization of legal structure—regulatory inertia and 
regulatory elaboration (Grattet et al. 1998). In the context of the U.S. organic food 
industry, I found evidence of regulatory elaboration (amendments) occurring in the 
later period of law passage. However, states passing amendments were generally 
within the yearly inter-quartile range of the similarity index (see Figure 2.2), 
suggesting that while an individual state’s domain or jurisdiction over the organic 
industry expanded at the state level, such expansion did not necessarily translate into 
greater overall legal variation. In contrast, regulatory inertia contributed significantly 
to overall legal heterogeneity in the context of organic food law. However, in contrast 
to the findings of a study of U.S. hate crime legislation (Grattet et al. 1998), I found 
that regulatory inertia was not confined to the early period of the observation period. 
Rather, regulatory inertia—as measured as the passage of a single law with no 
subsequent amendments—occurred primarily in the later period of legal structuration 
in the organic food industry. I also found that inertia measured as deviation from a 
yearly similarity score occurred in two ways. First, some states passed laws and never 
amended them, even as the overall mean similarity index decreased over time (as 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 by the upper whiskers and outliers of the box plots). Second, 
other states passed laws that were even less similar than the overall mean similarity 
index was to the baseline Oregon 1973 law (the lower whiskers and outlier of the box 
plots shown in Figure 2.2). For example, a number of states, late in the observation 
period, passed laws that consisted of a single provision (i.e., Maryland, 1990; North  
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Carolina, 1993; Missouri, 2000). Thus, while regulatory inertia occurred in this 
context, it did not occur in the early period of the observation window as suggested by 
Grattet et al., nor was it confined to states that passed a single law and never amended 
it.  
A second and more consequential modification of Grattet et al.’s (1998) study 
is that while the authors conclude that “the content of a state’s law is contingent upon 
when it enters the ongoing institutionalization process” (p. 303), I have shown that 
intra-industry governance organizations also significantly influence processes of 
regulatory inertia and elaboration. This approach, which focuses on the role of 
interests and preexisting industry-governance infrastructure in generating legal-content 
variation, has the potential to inform questions of which legal principles and 
configurations of provisions are produced and which come to dominate an industry 
(Edelman and Stryker 2005).  
Focusing on local nonprofit SBCOs and the federated SBCO OCIA, I found 
that the presence of a local nonprofit SBCO in a state predicts significant regulatory 
elaboration in terms of amendments to existing legal structure, whereas the presence 
of an OCIA chapter negatively predicts amendments. In terms of regulatory inertia, 
states dominated by local nonprofit SBCOs are less likely to have idiosyncratic laws 
when compared to the national mean similarity measure for each year. In contrast, the 
presence OCIA significantly predicts the presence of idiosyncratic laws. These 
findings contribute to existing literature in a number of ways.  
First, by examining the variation of content of laws, this study moves beyond 
extant conceptualizations of institutional change that tend to focus on a structurally 
deterministic, binary conceptualization of institutionalization to place emphasis on 
heterogeneity—an increasingly important element of institutional analysis, 
demonstrated by recent studies of institutional change and its effects (Schneiberg and  
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Bartley 2001; Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert 2005; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). 
Focusing on the degree to which a particular state’s laws deviate from mean similarity 
scores across all states provides clues into the impact of institutional processes versus 
political processes in dictating the content, scope, and efficacy of industry regulation 
(Edelman and Stryker 2005). Greater precision in measuring this type of heterogeneity 
in institutional structure, coupled with greater attention to the location and relative 
power of various stakeholders within a particular organizational field, can provide a 
solid foundation for moving beyond institutional theory’s historical focus on the 
effects of institutions (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott 2002) and toward a more robust 
examination of processes of institutional creation and transformation.  
Second, disaggregating organizational forms into more distinct categories 
allows for a more nuanced understanding of the differential impact of seemingly 
similar forms on broader field-level institutions and relations. Recent work in social 
movement theory has transcended the dichotomy of viewing organizational structure 
as either suppressing mobilization capacity (i.e., Michels 1962; Piven and Cloward 
1979; Rothschild and Whitt 1986) or facilitating it (McCarthy and Zald 1977) to 
examine more carefully how organizational attributes influence the ability to mobilize 
(see Clemens and Minkoff 2004; Edwards and McCarthy 2004:136–138). For 
example, Edwards and McCarthy note, “The choice of organizational form can have 
direct implications for the ability of an ongoing SMO to build the organizational 
capacity for certain types of collective action, such as grass-roots mobilization and 
litigation” (2004:137–138). Clemens and Minkoff echo that idea, “Rather than being 
homogenized as a ‘resource,’ particular organizations sustain distinctive cultures of 
interaction and shape trajectories of mobilization. The answer to ‘how shall we 
organize?’ (Clemens 1996) proves to be consequential for the development of actors 
as activists and the prospects for organized political action” (2004:157). They further  
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note that “distinctive styles of organizing also make activism attractive to different 
potential activists” (2004:157), suggesting that organizational form can influence who 
becomes members of one organization and not another.  
While SBCOs are not social movement organizations, local nonprofit SBCOs 
exhibited tendencies similar to those of SMOs. As such, in this study, I attempted to 
differentiate the capacity of local nonprofit certification organizations from that of a 
federated SBCO. While future research must more fully explicate the differential 
impact of organizational capacity from underlying motivations and scope of focus 
regarding legislative outcomes, this study nonetheless show clear differences in 
institutional outcomes for different types of SBCOs. More research that appreciates 
the role of organizational variety or heterogeneity in generating differential 
institutional outcomes is needed to validate and corroborate the findings in this study.  
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APPENDIX A:  
CODING SHEET FOR ORGANIC FOOD LAWS AND AMENDMENTS 
Provisions 
organic is defined 
organic is defined as certified organic 
certification is defined 
Producer is defined 
Producer must register with state 
Processor must register with state 
Handler must register with state 
Producer is certified by state 
Regulation of materials 
Approaches to regulation 
certifier has a Materials List for generic materials 
certifier emphasizes avoiding prohibited practices/materials, not soil building or other `positive' goals 
Materials for crop production 
Raw manure: required interval after use before crop can be harvested 
Fungicide-treated seed is prohibited or regulated 
Treated seed okay if organic is unavailable 
Non-certified annual seedlings prohibited 
Use of GEO/GMO materials prohibited 
Use of GEO/GMO derivatives prohibited 
Biosolids (sewage sludge) prohibited 
Irradiation prohibited 
Sprouts 
Organic crop management 
requires recordkeeping 
designates the number of years records must be kept 
state officials have access to a producer/processor's etc. records, land, warehouses, etc. 
Organic plan required 
plan submitted annually 
on-site inspection at least annually 
Crop rotation required for annual plants 
time between pesticide and harvest 
time between fertilizer and harvest 
`Transitional organic' product labeling is permitted 
Soil nutrient test is required for certification 
Soil residue test is required for certification 
the FDA or EPA % of minimum pesticide residues allowable 
prohibits the commingling of organic and conventionally grown products 
`Parallel production' is allowed, if additional record keeping/organizational requirements are met 
Rotating fields in and out of organic production (even with full transition time) is prohibited 
When irrigating, operator must practice water conservation 
Certification program management 
General points  
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Provisions 
affidavits are mentioned as legitimate means of verification 
Annual renewal of certification 
Annual inspection of operation 
state performs unannounced second inspection on all first-time applicants 
state performs unannounced inspections on a random set of recertifying operators 
state reserves the right to make unannounced inspections at any time 
state will investigate reasonable reports of violations 
certified operator can appeal decertification decision 
Unintentional contamination 
Buffer zone requirements (space separation, physical barriers, runoff diversion) 
Operator must test irrigation water regularly for contamination by organically prohibited materials 
Regular residue tests required for soil 
Regular residue tests required for crops 
Allowable residue level for residues in produce 
Crop with residues over allowed limit can never be labeled `certified organic', regardless of reason 
Consequences of drift of prohibited materials on to certified crops or land, when drift is not due to fault of certified 
operator 
Crop cannot be labeled `organic', regardless of amount of drift 
Affected land is automatically decertified, regardless of the amount of drift 
Enforcement procedures 
Organic plan emphasized as enforcement tool 
Audit trail emphasized as enforcement tool (not just for animals) 
Medical records for individual animals (or flocks, for fowl) must be traceable through life cycle 
Animals must be individually identified on body by physical marker or tag (except fowl) 
Record keeping system must be adequate to ensure products of treated animals are not labeled organic 
Animals treated with prohibited materials must be identified on body of animal (with tag, etc.) to ensure no 
confusion (except fowl) 
Organic Processing 
Processors must keep records/time 
Audit Trail 
Product guidelines by labeling category 
`Organic' on principal display panel (PDP) requires 95±100% organic ingredients 
Requires a different percentage 
`Made with organic' (MWO) on PDP requires 50±95% organic ingredients 
Requires 70±95% organic ingredients 
Products with some organic ingredients, but not enough to make the `MWO' cutoff, can say `contains organic 
[ingredients]' on information panel 
Organic ingredients cannot be identified if entire product does not meet criteria for `organic' label 
certification of processing is required for `organic [product]' and `MWO [ingredients]' label claims 
certification of processing is required even if labeling only identifies organic ingredients on side panel 
Product composition 
For `organic' and `MWO' products: 
Non-agricultural ingredients should be minimized 
certifier encourages using 100% organic ingredients, or requires preferential use of organic ingredients 
Genetically engineered ingredients are prohibited 
Irradiated ingredients are prohibited  
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Provisions 
Nutritional quality should be preserved in processing 
This is emphasized in processing section, not just in principles of organic production 
certifier allows an expanded set of non-agricultural ingredients in `MWO' products 
certifier allows any ingredient to be used in `COI' products that are certified organically processed 
Processors making only `COI' products are exempted from some non-composition requirements 
Facility management 
Organic plan is required 
`Parallel production' is allowed, if additional record keeping/organizational requirements are met 
Procedures to ensure organic integrity 
HACCP or similar system involving critical control points 
ISO 9000 series certification 
Extra withdrawal time required after fumigation with a prohibited material 
Regular or required residue testing of products 
certifier can test for residues if reason for suspicion 
`Ecologically sound' waste management plan 
Producer must minimize packaging 
Handling regulations (and defined) 
Must be licensed with state 
retailer not considered a handler 
Retailer must keep records =2 if handler, =1 if retailer 
year records must be kept by retailers 
Requires retailers to maintain audit trail 
certifier has detailed description of requirements for non-processor handlers 
Handlers dealing in only MWO or COI products are subject to less restrictive standards 
Handlers are subject to less restrictive standards or a less thorough certification and inspection process, if organic 
sales are below a specified level 
With each transaction in supply chain, both buyer and seller (if certified) must record transaction, date, and volume 
exchanged 
All processors and handlers must maintain audit trail sufficient to track raw materials from supplier to retail 
On-farm processors must meet all processing standards 
Organic labeling guidelines 
Processed and unprocessed products labeled `organic' 
Label is required to be sold as organic 
When two products come from two different cert orgs., must have both names on label 
mandates the creation of a state organic label (e.g. Montana Certified Organic) 
if the product is labeled as organic, it meets the state code 
certifier must pre-approve entire label 
Label on retail item must identify certifier of the final handler or distributor of product 
certifier contact information is required on retail item 
In multi-ingredient products, listing same ingredient from organic and non-organic sources is prohibited 
In multi-ingredient products, listing an ingredient as `organic when available' is prohibited 
if less than all of the ingredients are not organic, then not organic 
All products labeled `organic' 
"organic when available" label not acceptable 
Producers name/address on the label 
`Transitional' product labeling  
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Provisions 
Transitional product certifiable 
Transitional product can use same logo as certified organic 
Label, seal, or statement contains the word `organic' 
Labeling through distribution chain: 
`Organic' required on invoice 
`Organic' required on non-retail container (box, bin, case, pallet) 
certifier ID required on invoice 
certifier ID required on non-retail container (box, bin, case, pallet) 
provides other cert. , in addition to `organic' or `transitional' 
Seal is a registered trademark 
Statements on packaged multi-ingredient foods 
For products labeled `organic' on PDP: 
certifier name may appear on PDP 
certifier logo may appear on PDP 
certifier name may appear on label 
certifier logo may appear on label 
`Organic' must be smaller than product ID 
Individual id. of organic ingredients on info panel 
Statement of percent organic ingredients 
Organizational structure 
Program is self-sufficient in funding 
State programs: program has advisory board 
the dept of ag. is an organic certifier 
dept of ag contracts out cert. to a private entity 
dept. of ag sets certification procedures/organic regulations 
certifier is licensed, authorized, or approved in some way be state(s) in which it operates 
Advisory board is mandated by statute 
number of people on board 
board producer 
board processor 
board handler 
board environmentalist 
board technical 
board state ag/extension 
Consumer rep 
retailer 
misc. board 
Board has input in standards decisions 
Board has final decisions for standards 
Board has input in de/certification decisions 
Board has final decision for de/certification 
designates the composition of that board 
creates a fund especially for organic 
creates avenue for complaints to be heard 
Interactions with other certifiers and national bodies  
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Provisions 
Standards state intent to create reciprocity agreements 
STATE POWERS 
provision outlining mislabeling as unlawful 
Unlawful to certify in violation of statute 
Unlawful to produce, handle, or process organic food unless registered with state 
Unlawful to make a false statement 
Unlawful to forge, falsify, fail to obtain, retain, disclose records 
unlawful to advertise label, or represent that fertilizer or pesticide may be used when it is a prohibited substance 
Unlawful to commingle 
whether or not the law stipulates a fine for any unlawful activity 
amount of fine specified 
type of fine specified 
unintentional fine 
the use of an injunction 
revoke the certification status of a producer 
revoke the certification status of a processor 
allows the state to revoke the license of a handler 
revoke registration of a cert. organization 
issue stop sale order 
issue a cease and desist order 
bans a certifier to certify his/her own farm 
Relation between state and cert. orgs. 
certification organizations must register with the state 
Conflict of interest provision 
certification represents compliance with the law 
out of state certification must meet WA standards 
Annual fee 
specifies qualities of a cert org (expertise, no. of personnel, etc.) 
specifies provisions for certification organizations. 
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PAPER 3:  
CERTIFYING THE HARVEST:  
THE ROLE OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS IN 
THE ORGANIC FOOD INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditional economic explanations conceptualize the origins of markets as 
unproblematic and as a given. Arrow (1974), for example, states, “Although we are 
not usually explicit about it, we really postulate that when a market could be created, it 
would be” (quoted in Sarasvathy and Dew 2005:533–534). Williamson (1985) 
similarly reflects an uncritical attitude toward the origins of markets by stating, “In the 
beginning, there were markets” (p. 87). More recent work in historical economics 
suggests that “institutions organically emerge in the initial stages of market 
development as unintended and unforeseeable results from the pursuit of individual 
interests” (Greif 2005:728). The underlying assumptions of these quotes are that 
markets emerge through atomized market behavior, that entrepreneurs engage in 
optimal decision making, and that consumers have well-defined preferences. 
Economic sociologists, organization theorists, and strategists have challenged these 
assumptions, emphasizing the collective, political, and often unintended nature of 
processes associated with new market emergence. A growing number of scholars 
acknowledge the significant amount of “institutional work” needed to lessen 
uncertainty and ambiguity to an acceptable level before a market can be established 
and grow (Zucker 1986; Fligstein 1996; Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2002; 
Stinchcombe 2002; Rao 2004).  
Recent work in organization theory underscores the importance of institutional 
entrepreneurs in the creation of new institutions and industries. To date, research in 
this vein has focused on delineating the processes and strategies by which institutional 
entrepreneurs are able to embed new “beliefs, norms and values into social structures”  
104 
and precipitate institutional change (Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000:240). Much of this 
research is grounded in social movement theory (See McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 
1996), focusing on key processes including the identification of political opportunities, 
appropriate framing and theorization of problems and solutions, and mobilization of 
key constituencies. Studies of institutional entrepreneurship highlight the skill of 
institutional entrepreneurs in forging new institutions in the face of existing ones 
(Fligstein 1997). For example, activities such as “demonstration events” sponsored by 
supporters of new technologies allow potential consumers to gain firsthand experience 
with radically new technologies to assess their utility, reliability, and validity.
1  
A central, yet understudied means by which institutional entrepreneurs 
mitigate concerns over legitimacy and uncertainty is through the creation and 
promulgation of standards (Garud et al. 2002). In the absence of support from key 
institutional actors (the state and the professions) that are often initially reluctant to 
endorse new/marginal economic practices and innovations that deviate too far from 
taken-for-granted ways of consumption and product use (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, 
and King 1991), standards-based certification organizations
2 (referred to hereafter as 
SBCOs) are often organized by interested actors who create and promulgate standards 
in an effort to supply market order. Like institutions that “make new labels, and the 
labels make new kinds of people” (Douglas 1986:108), standards and the 
organizations that promote them can wield tremendous classificatory power by 
providing “ontological closure” around a particular product definition (Pinch and 
Bijker 1987) and by allocating material and social resources to people and 
organizations based on criteria embodied in standards. Through the use of 
                                                 
1 Examples include the telephone (Fischer 1992), the bicycle (Smith 1973), and the automobile (Rao 
1994; 2004). 
2 By standards-based certification organizations, I refer to organizations whose primary purpose is to 
create and/or promote standards, verify the compliance of other organizations with those standards, and 
formally acknowledge that an organization has met the standards through the conferral of a 
certification, endorsement, or accreditation.  
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measurement, recording, and ranking processes, new social entities are brought into 
existence (Espeland and Stevens 1998).  
Given the potential for standards to channel behavior, some scholars suggest 
they be placed on equal footing with markets and hierarchies because of their ability to 
facilitate contact, coordination, and anonymous market exchange (Brunsson 2000). 
Yet, standardization has been largely neglected by the social sciences when compared 
with other sources of order such as the state, markets and organization (Brunsson and 
Jacobsson 2000).  
In this paper, I respond to this call by examining how SBCOs structure and 
provide order in nascent market settings. Specifically, I seek to answer the following 
questions: How do SBCOs provide market order? How do the activities of SBCOs 
influence market entry and exit rates? While a significant body of literature has 
accumulated on the role of standards in technology fields,
3 we know relatively little 
about the dynamics of standards in new nontechnological product markets in which 
the standards themselves are central to the value of the product they are purported to 
describe and evaluate (Espeland and Stevens 1998:338). In other words, these types of 
standards serve to differentiate otherwise identical products in a market. While there is 
no visible difference in the products or services provided, there are clear differences in 
the processes and inputs used in producing the good. For example, fair-trade coffee 
looks and tastes no different from conventional coffee. However, there is a price 
premium for fair-trade coffee because its value is derived from a set of standards that 
                                                 
3 Scholarly work on the role of technology standards has shown that common technological standards 
facilitate compatibility and interoperability between products or networks of products. These shared 
standards must emerge before firms can evaluate products and exchange in the marketplace (Garud et 
al. 2002). Significant work in economics and strategy has demonstrated how the creation of 
technological standards generates network externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Farrell and Saloner 
1986). Technology standards can also lead to path dependence, irreversibility, and lock-in (David 1985; 
Arthur 1989). “Dominant design” is a closely related concept because it provides firms with the 
possibility of enjoying monopolistic control of the market (Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Tushman 
and Anderson 1986). For a recent review of this literature, see Quelin, Abdessemed, and Durand 2001.  
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requires importers to meet international criteria, pay a minimum price per pound for 
coffee, and provide credit and technical support to farmers.   
The U.S. organic food industry provides an ideal context to explore these 
research questions because, as is the case in a number of other product markets, the 
value of the product is derived from processes and inputs of the production rather than 
solely from the product itself.
4 In recent years, organic agriculture has grown into a 
26-billion-dollar industry, making it the fastest growing sector in both U.S. and global 
agricultural markets. Although organic production accounts for less than .2 percent of 
U.S. agricultural output, it has posted a 21 percent yearly growth rate since 1997, and 
organic cropland has doubled over the same period.  
Despite such robust growth and the recent passage of federal regulations 
governing the industry, organic agriculture was marginalized for much of its history. 
In the early years, both market mechanisms and extant institutional structures failed to 
provide organic farmers with the stability and support necessary to grow beyond local 
and specialized niche markets. Because organic agricultural production uses no 
chemical fertilizer or pesticides and generally results in smaller yields and higher labor 
costs than conventional agriculture, organic production was seen by the majority of the 
American farming establishment and policymakers as unscientific and inefficient—a 
regression to agriculture of the 1930s. The logic of sustainability and ecology 
underlying organic food production was inconsistent with prevailing logics in 
conventional agriculture that centered on technology and efficiency. Being excluded 
from existing channels of access and having little assistance from agricultural market 
mechanisms, movement insiders mobilized resources to create and advocate a viable 
set of standards that differentiated organic production techniques and products from 
those of mainstream agriculture. Consequently, organic farmers, through the 
                                                 
4 Sustainable lumber and paper, green energy, “cruelty free” personal care products, bird-friendly 
coffee, and other fair-trade commodities all derive their value in this way.  
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development of standards, certification, and labeling processes, sowed the seeds for a 
movement/market that has quietly grown up in the shadow of conventional 
agribusiness and now dominates the sector in terms of growth.  
In the following section, I theoretically explore how standards and SBCOs 
structure markets and firm behavior, motivating my hypotheses concerning the 
relationship of SBCOs and their activities to market entry and exit. I then provide a 
brief historical narrative of the U.S. organic food industry, highlighting the important 
role of SBCOs in its success. Following this narrative, I present the analyses, results, 
and conclusion.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Institutional entrepreneurs are organized actors that have an interest in 
particular institutional arrangements and who skillfully leverage resources (cultural, 
social, and material) to create new institutions or transform existing ones (DiMaggio 
1988; Fligstein 1997; Rao et al. 2000; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004). Garud et 
al. (2002) outline key actions taken by institutional entrepreneurs:  
Institutional entrepreneurs create a whole new system of meaning that ties the 
functioning of disparate sets of institutions together . . . They define, 
legitimize, combat or co-opt rivals to succeed in their institutional 
projects . . . Assuming the role of champions, they energize efforts toward 
collective action and devise strategies for establishing stable sequences of 
interaction with other organizations to create entirely new industries and 
associated institutions. (pp. 196–197) 
Garud and colleagues point out that “the presence or absence of common 
standards impacts innovation within a technological field” (2002:198), implying that 
organizations that create and advocate standards in a particular field will likely 
influence the behavior of other organizations within that field. SBCOs can also 
accredit those same organizations, providing them with a possible buffer from  
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environmental selection pressures (Wiley and Zald 1968; Durand and McGuire 2005). 
A number of studies have considered how standards and/or certification processes 
influence well-established fields such as health care (Ruef and Scott 1998; Scott, Ruef, 
Mendel, and Caronna 2000), education (Wiley and Zald 1968; Zajac and Kraatz 1993; 
Casile and Davis-Blake 2002; Durand and McGuire 2005), nonprofits (Litwack and 
Hylton 1962; Singh, House, and Tucker 1986), and college sports (Stern 1981). Yet 
few studies have focused on how SBCOs influence firm entry and exit in nascent 
markets.  
I propose that SBCOs fulfill four roles critical to new market niche creation 
and growth. First, SBCOs create standards. Although SBCOs create standards for a 
variety of reasons (Brunsson 2000), I focus in this paper on the intentional use of 
standards to differentiate one product from another, with the explicit intent to create a 
market for that product. Second, SBCOs serve as advocates or evangelists 
(Stinchcombe 2001) of their standards, seeking to gain adherents. Third, once a firm 
has adopted standards, SBCOs exert normative control over it through verification 
processes to guarantee that standards are followed. Fourth, SBCOs provide an 
endorsement or certification to those organizations found in compliance with the 
standards promulgated.  
SBCOs and Standards Creation  
Sociologists have long been interested in the concept of market order. 
Durkheim explored the noncontractual aspects of contracts, and Weber examined the 
centrality of institutions and reputation in economic transactions. Contemporary 
sociologists have continued to examine the source and outcomes of market order in a 
vast array of settings.
5 For example, scholars approaching industry and technology 
creation from a cultural/cognitive perspective (e.g., Pinch and Bijker 1987; Garud and 
                                                 
5 See Biggart and Beamish 2003 for a thorough review.  
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Rappa 1994; Porac, Ventresca, and Mishina 2002) begin with the premise that new 
products and services are not necessarily easily understood or commensurable. As 
such, “product ontologies” serve as cognitive understandings that concatenate product 
attributes, usage conditions, and buyer characteristics into a coherent bundle that 
clearly defines a product or service. This then allows the product or service to be 
exchanged in market transactions (Porac et al. 2002).  
Scholars from the Conventions School (Favereau 2002) provide a related, yet 
distinct, explanation of the origins of market ordering mechanisms. Sidestepping the 
market versus hierarchies question, Conventions School scholars focus on how 
individuals achieve economic coordination “via obedience to rules, norms, and 
intersubjectively mediated action of various forms” (Biggart and Beamish 2003:456). 
As such, economic coordination results from the interpretive and pragmatic actions of 
market actors to collectively determine with others how to handle uncertainty in 
particular situations. Bundles of conventions then become solutions to thorny market 
problems and these conventions have the propensity to congeal and become reified—
similar to institutions (Biggart and Beamish 2003). Solving these types of coordination 
problems is antecedent to the emergence and growth of new markets, technological 
regimes, products, and organizational forms (Leblebici et al. 1991; Garud and Rappa 
1994; Garud et al. 2002; Schneiberg 2002). 
Formal standards can embody product ontologies and generate conventions 
that provide the needed structure, coherence, and meaning to products, actors, and 
actions in new market arenas. By formal, I mean “the development of an abstraction of 
a large amount of concrete data, arrived at in such a way that further social action is 
governed by that abstraction, without in general going back to the original data” 
(Stinchcombe 2001:3). For example, having a blueprint that is approved by a client 
eliminates the necessity of continually returning to the client for her approval  
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regarding design preferences at each significant stage in the building process 
(Stinchcombe 2001). When formalization works well, its purpose is the same as the 
purpose of the substance on which it is based—a license to practice medicine is 
typically regarded as an appropriate reflection of a doctor’s knowledge and skill. As 
such, there is no need on the part of a new patient to “go behind” the abstraction (the 
doctor’s license to practice medicine) to examine the doctor’s educational and 
professional background.  
Ideally, for an abstraction to be continually effective in governing economic 
action, it should be  accurate (does not misdescribe the situation that is to be 
governed), economical (captures cleanly and orderly only that which is necessary to be 
easily understood), sufficient (it contains all aspects of a situation that are necessary 
for effective governance), and have sufficient scope (the range to which the 
abstraction system can be applied is wide enough for most situations that have to be 
acted upon to be included) (Stinchcombe 2001). While these conditions constitute an 
adequate system of abstraction, the system itself should also be communicable to those 
organizations or people that perform the relevant activities affiliated with the 
abstraction. To be communicable, a given abstraction should be able to be transmitted 
to, understood by, and believed by a receiver of the abstraction. Further, the 
abstraction, to be efficacious and not break down, must exhibit characteristics of 
transparency and durability.    
SBCOs and the Advocacy of Standards 
Standards not only need creators, they also need advocates. Unlike the state, 
standardizers have no coercive power to induce others to adopt their standards. Indeed, 
standards can be seen as “pieces of general advice offered to large numbers of 
potential adopters” (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000:2). Because standards are usually 
voluntary, standardizers must expend considerable effort to convince a target audience  
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of the need and benefits of adopting a particular standard. While an abstraction must 
be adequate and communicable, it must also be communicated.  
The need for advocacy of standards is particularly high in nascent 
markets/industries that rely on standards for the success of their radical new product. 
In the beginning of such markets, advocates of the products must make claims about 
the utility and desirability of the radical new product (Rao 2004); they must evangelize 
an understanding of what the product is, what it does, and why it is useful. In contrast 
to the conventional coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms that generate sets of 
similar organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), evangelism is an alternative, yet 
effective, mechanism that explains how the “conversion” tactics of the evangelistic 
advocates spread a new form of organization (Stinchcombe 2002). 
SBCOs and Processes of Verification  
SBCOs not only increase and formalize advocacy efforts but also facilitate the 
adoption of standards through “enrolling” individuals or organizations. Once 
organizations enroll and adopt standards, they must often modify their organizational 
structures and activities, submit to information gathering, and allow on-site access to 
SBCOs, particularly if they want to receive continued SBCO endorsement. Continued 
and honest monitoring provides important “signals” (Spence 1973) for both the 
certifier and the certified. These signals cannot be entirely symbolic because audiences 
will soon begin to discount the signal if it does not adequately correspond to the 
underlying quality or characteristic it represents (Zucker 1986). However, if the 
abstraction remains consistent with the reality it represents, legitimacy accrues for 
both the abstraction as well as the concept behind it (e.g., “fair trade” becomes more 
cognitively legitimate with each additional wholesaler submitting to the prescribed 
standards and monitoring). Therefore, standardizers will be more successful in seeing 
their standards adopted if they create a formal organization of which other  
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organizations become members. Through this formal organization, standardizers can 
require members to adhere to their standards and can verify compliance through 
monitoring activities. Through these processes, voluntary standards begin to take on a 
rule-like character, which equates to power:  
Rule systems as important social technologies become resources and stakes in 
social interaction and the strategic structuring of social life. Thus, they cannot 
be viewed as simply “neutral” or “technical means” of realizing certain 
purposes . . . [They constitute] a power resource which social agents utilize in 
their struggles and negotiations over alternative structural forms and 
development of social systems, serving their interests. (Burns 1986:28–29) 
Through this power, SBCOs increase their ability to determine continuing 
membership, set additional rules, and pool resources for continued dissemination of 
standards and education of would-be adopters. This increased power can also lead to 
advantageous positioning to influence broader regulatory structures, create status 
differentiation among actors, and eclipse competing standards (Ahrne, Brunsson, and 
Garsten 2000).  
If a set of standards takes hold among a group of organizations, they have the 
propensity to generate commensuration—rendering two things equal (Espeland and 
Stevens 1998). For example, commensuration is achieved when a processor of tomato 
sauce can combine for processing organic tomatoes grown by multiple producers in 
multiple locations with confidence that all are grown according to the same principles 
and processes. Likewise, customers can be indifferent to the origin of the tomato or 
the idiosyncratic characteristics of the grower because the standard commensurates or 
renders one organic tomato equal to another. In the presence of standards and 
agreement on those standards (and consequently commensuration), the price 
mechanism can begin to operate, reflecting the quality of the product or service. It 
should be noted that commensuration can occur in markets in the absence of 
standards, but standards tend to increase a market’s durability.   
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As outlined above, SBCOs can play a key role in creating a fertile context for 
growth in new industries. First, by creating standards, they make claims about the 
nature and characteristics of a product. This activity is particularly important in 
markets where it is difficult to visually distinguish similar products from one another. 
Second, SBCOs act as institutional entrepreneurs by evangelizing standards and 
infusing them with value. Third, SBCOs exercise normative control over a firm once it 
adopts the SBCOs standards, and as more organizations adopt the standards, SBCOs 
gain increasing normative control over the field. Finally, through monitoring efforts, 
SBCOs maintain their own integrity and verify the claims of those they monitor. This 
results in increased legitimacy for both the individual firm and the concept that the 
standards represent. SBCOs serve as direct knowledge-diffusion mechanisms that help 
to establish the identity, legitimacy, and accountability of the new industry, the quality 
and value of its products and services, and the integrity and reliability of firms (Baum 
and Rao 2004).  
Although the mere presence of standards in a new industry could feasibly 
increase entry into a new market, I propose that SBCOs provide mechanisms of 
stability, control, and monitoring that encourage market entry in a way that standards 
alone cannot. When those espousing a set of standards create formal organizations, 
they increase the potency of their standards because they have more organizing 
instruments at their disposal to promulgate the standards and to influence the behavior 
of adopters (Arhne et al. 2000). Although it may be that not all players within a field 
adopt SBCO standards, actions taken by SBCOs generate legitimacy and reliability for 
a new market. As such, I hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater numbers of SBCOs in a given geographic area will 
increase rates of market entry.  
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Endorsement/Certification 
An additional function of SBCOs is to provide a certification or endorsement 
that validates the claims a person or an organization makes. Past research has 
demonstrated the need for organizations to seek out endorsements from institutional 
actors (Singh, House, and Tucker 1986; Baum and Oliver 1991; Ruef and Scott 1998). 
Scott (1987) refers to this type of institutional mechanism as authorization. 
Authorization is the legitimation of the structural features or elements of an 
organizational form through legitimation by a superordinate unit. A key feature of this 
mechanism that distinguishes it from coercion is that the subordinate unit is “not 
compelled to conform but voluntarily seeks out the attention and approval of the 
authorizing agent” (Scott 1987:502). The ability to gain such endorsement increases 
flows of legitimacy, status, and access to resources and market channels. Following 
this logic, I hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Having certification from an SBCO will decrease a firm’s 
likelihood of market exit.  
 
A centerpiece of social exchange theory is that actors’ reputations are 
constructed based in part on the reputations of their associates (Blau 1964). A 
significant amount of literature has demonstrated that status tends to flow across 
relationships (Merton 1973; Burt 1987; Podolny and Stuart 1995; Stuart, Hoang, and 
Hybels 1999). For example, Stuart et al. (1999) demonstrate that the prominence of a 
firm’s exchange partners influences the success of that firm. This idea is founded on 
the premise that resource holders will tend to value more highly the evaluations of a 
prominent actor because they implicitly assume that prominent actors are more likely  
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to discern quality under conditions of uncertainty than less prominent ones (see Stuart 
et al. 1999:319). Given this argument regarding status, I posit the following:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the prominence of a certifier that certifies a firm, the 
less likely that firm will be to exit the market. 
 
Certification may also provide particular benefits to early entrants in a nascent 
industry. A wealth of literature has been generated around the concept of first-mover 
advantages (e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). Advantages include economic 
rents, market control, establishing switching costs, and channel control. While first-
mover advantages exist, evidence suggests that such advantages are moderated by a 
firm’s resources and capabilities (Szymanski, Troy, and Bharadwaj 1995). Third-party 
certification can be conceptualized as a key firm resource in new markets where 
unambiguous measures of quality are rare. Furthermore, there are benefits in terms of 
establishing credibility within a value chain if a firm’s products and services are third-
party certified. For example, wholesalers or other buyers in the value chain may 
require certification as a precondition for purchase. It is reasonable to believe that 
early entrants that are certified will be more likely to establish and maintain key 
transaction partners and, by extension, to remain longer in the market than firms that 
are not. Therefore, I propose the following:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Having certification from a third party will enhance the 
advantages of early entry and will decrease the likelihood of market exit. 
 
In addition to theorizing a direct effect of third-party certification on the 
likelihood of exit, I posit that benefits of certification will increase in the face of  
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increased competition. Population ecology has demonstrated that powerful selection 
mechanisms begin to operate as competition within an organizational population 
increases (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Under such a scenario, the ability for 
organizations to obtain scarce resources (and thus shelter themselves from strong 
selection forces) will increase their survival chances. Thus, certification can mitigate 
the effect of increasing competition. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 5: Third party certification will moderate the effects of increased 
competition on organizational exit. 
CONTEXT 
The origin of the U.S. organic food industry has its roots in the early decades 
of the 20th century. A fringe group of scholars and farmers
6 who believed that 
agriculture was better understood and practiced through biological and ecological 
principles, conducted experiments, compiled knowledge, and disseminated their 
findings. In the early 1940s, J. I. Rodale, a publisher-turned-organic farmer, purchased 
a farm in Pennsylvania and began farming according to the methods and practices of 
these early pioneers of organic agriculture. To complement his efforts on his 
experimental farm and to demonstrate the utility of organic methods, Rodale launched 
a magazine in 1942 through which readers shared their organic agriculture experiences 
(Rodale 1942:14) and subsequently published a number of highly influential books 
that became key sources of information for pioneering organic farmers. Rodale found 
little widespread success in the first 20 years of his efforts. However, his vision of a 
radically different food system gained greater momentum as broader movements 
                                                 
6 Among the most prominent pioneers and writings in the organic movement were: F. H. King, Farmers 
for Forty Centuries, or Permanent Agriculture in China, Korea, and Japan, 1911; Rudolph Steiner, 
Agriculture: A Course of Eight Lectures, 1924; Sir Albert Howard, An Agricultural Testament, 1940; 
and Lady Eve Balfour, The Living Soil, 1943.  
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surrounding environmentalism drew the public’s attention to the dangers of pesticides 
and other agricultural chemicals. During the 1960s and 1970s, organic agriculture and 
its associated practices resonated with an increasing audience of gardeners, farmers, 
and consumers.  
As interest in organic farming grew, maintaining the integrity of the organic 
concept became paramount for movement farmers and consumers. Recognizing the 
changes that would accompany increasing consumer demand, Rodale’s son wrote in 
1971,  
For a long time, organic farming was a labor of love. Organic farmers rejoiced 
in the purity of an untarnished Nature, and farmed without chemicals for the 
sheer joy of saving the soil. Many of those organic farmers managed to make 
money too, but they were guided more by principle than by an urge to 
profit . . . some money-oriented farmers are prepared to accept a loose 
definition of what organic means. The problem is with marketers, not farmers 
because they are hungry to get a slice of the pie. (p. 73) 
In the face of increasing opportunism, Rodale began to develop a systematic 
verification system. In 1971, Rodale’s magazine, Organic Gardening and Farming, 
initiated a pilot organic certification program in California. The program consisted of 
obtaining a commitment from each farmer to build or maintain a three percent humus 
content in the soil within five years. An organic seal was developed to identify the 
commitment, commodity, and location of the farmer. Soil analyses, residue analyses, 
and personal inspections were also part of the program (Allen 1971:81). In 1972, the 
Organic Gardening and Farming (OGF) program included a questionnaire that asked 
farmers for information regarding the acreage committed to organic production, types 
of crops to be raised, normal problems facing the farmer (i.e., weeds, insects, fungus 
disease, and soil fertilizing), and organic methods and materials used. The OGF 
certification program grew to include regional groups in 20 states before it was 
terminated in 1973. After the termination of the program, farmers in various states  
118 
developed their own certification programs to continue to ensure the integrity of 
organically grown produce. Beginning with about 50 farmers, the California Certified 
Organic Farmers (CCOF) became the first organization following the termination of 
the OGF program to certify growers.  
After the creation of CCOF, certification organizations formed from local 
networks of organic farmers throughout the United States. The early certification 
organizations appeared in Oregon, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Michigan, and 
Minnesota. In addition to certification services, nonprofit certification organizations 
dedicated significant organizational resources to information sharing through monthly 
newsletters, conferences, and on-site workshops. In the absence of substantial support 
from university extension services and other traditional sources of agricultural 
information and assistance, these organizations became repositories of expertise, 
refining, accumulating, and disseminating knowledge of organic production practices. 
After a time, other types of certification organizations got involved in the industry. 
State departments of agriculture and for-profit firms entered the industry to provide 
third-party certification. While multiple verification processes existed, wholesalers 
increasingly demanded certified organic products. Phrases such as “we only accept 
CCOF certified products” or “we sell Oregon Tilth certified products” began to fill 
wholesaler directories. The growth and expansion of SBCOs had significant 
implications for producers entering the industry. In the following section, I describe 
the data and methods employed in my analysis of these implications and then explain 
my results.  
DATA AND METHODS 
The bulk of the data for this study comes from the National Organic Directory 
(NOD; 1986–2001), published by the Community Alliance with Family Farmers. This 
was the industry’s most comprehensive listing of producers, wholesalers, resource  
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groups, certification organizations, retailers, support businesses, and manufacturers in 
the United States. Listing in the directory was free for all organizations over the 
duration of the study period.  
I depart from the norm in organizational ecology that considers the beginning 
of a directory as a signal of the birth of a new organizational population. Directories 
generally appear fairly early in an industry’s development (Carroll and Hannan 
2000:168), yet firms in the “industry” are often already functioning with operations 
well underway before the publication of the first directory. For example, the first 
certification organization began in 1973, and a handful of farmers had been farming 
organically since the early 1940s. However, the National Organic Directory did not 
begin publication until 1986. Therefore, instead of conceptualizing a directory as 
evidence of the “birth” of an organizational population, one can see a directory as an 
effort to knit together a national market from otherwise disparate buyers and suppliers: 
“When one finds a continuous series of directories of a given kind of organization, a 
publisher believes many others will want to find the firms to sell to or to buy 
from . . . the purpose of the directory is to create markets; otherwise it is of only 
scientific interest, and will not make any money for the publisher” (Stinchcombe 
2002:419, emphasis added).  
An email from a key informant at the Community Alliance for Family Farmers 
(CAFF, the organization that produced the directory) alludes to the idea that the 
National Organic Directory served to create a broader market for organic products:  
It is inspiring to think that this organization, in its various incarnations, really 
did affect the organic foods industry, starting at a time when there *was* no 
industry—just isolated growers . . . It’s amazing to realize it now, but when 
CAFF started the National Organic Directory, it was almost impossible to find 
organic produce unless you knew someone who grew it. The whole thing was 
word of mouth. Gleaners (“food conspiracies”) from city co-op living groups 
would go out into the countryside, from farm to farm, looking for well-grown 
food. All summer long, dilapidated trucks full of hippies lurched down our  
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driveway in plumes of dust, hoping to fill up with organic fruit. (Personal 
correspondence, November 16, 2005) 
Consequently, I conceptualize entries and exits into and out of the directory as entries 
and exits from the marketplace rather than births and deaths of organizations.  
Dependent Variables 
There are two dependent variables in this paper: market entry and market exit. 
In this study, I focus on the population of organic producers. The unit of analysis for 
the market entry is U.S. state. The unit of analysis for market exit is the individual 
producer. I measure market entry as the count of all new farms that are listed in the 
NOD at time t, which is updated annually over the course of the observation period. 
To measure market exit, I constructed annual spells for each farm, beginning with the 
first time the farm is listed in the directory until the time that it disappears from the 
directory.  
Independent Variables 
Standards-Based Certification Organizations. To test the effect of SBCOs on 
market entry (hypothesis 1), I include a measure of the total number of certification 
organizations present in each U.S. state for each year of the observation period. To 
verify information on certification organizations listed in the NOD, I also consulted 
three additional directories,
7 thereby capturing all certification organizations operating 
in the United States during the observation period of this study.  
Certification. To test hypothesis 2, I include a dummy variable for each year a 
firm is third-party certified.  
SBCO prominence. To test hypothesis 3, regarding the prominence of the third-
party certifier, I generate a prominence score for each firm on a yearly basis that 
                                                 
7 One published by the Organic Farming Research Foundation, another by the Agricultural Marketing 
Service of the USDA, and the third by ATTRA (Appropriate Technology Transfer for Rural Areas).  
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reflects the proportion of all farms certified by the certification organization j that 
certifies the farm i at time t.  
Certification x early entrants. To test hypothesis 4, I interact a dummy variable 
for all firms founded prior to 1990
8 with the dummy variable for third-party 
certification.  
Certification x density
2. To test the moderating effect of third-party 
certification on competition (hypothesis 5), I include an interaction term with third-
party certification interacting with producer density.
2 Unless otherwise noted, all data 
for these measures are derived from information found in the NOD. 
Control Variables 
I control for a number of important variables. First, I include a number of 
industry-related controls: the amount of land in farms, number of farms, change in the 
number of farms, change in the amount of land in farms, and the average size of farms 
in a state. These data come from the National Agricultural Statistics Service of the 
United States Department of Agriculture and are measured at the state level. Second, I 
control for the number of legal provisions passed in a state related to organic food. 
These data come from Westlaw and state administrative and regulatory codes. Third, I 
include a number of demand controls. I attempt to capture demand from buyers by 
controlling for the number of wholesalers in a state. I also include a measure of 
broader consumer demand. Because there is no data on the actual consumer demand 
for organic products during the period of study, I include a proxy for consumer 
demand. Because members of environmental groups tend to be more concerned about 
the impact of pesticides and fertilizers on the environment, I posit that Sierra Club 
members are more likely to be consumers of organic food than the average consumer. 
                                                 
8 Following a food scare in 1989 involving a carcinogenic chemical growth regulator on apples, demand 
outstripped supply, and the organic industry grew beyond local niche markets to a broader national 
marketplace (Lipson 2001).  
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Therefore, I include a yearly count of Sierra Club membership by state to capture 
consumer demand. To account for the possibility of reverse causation (increasing 
demand for certification leading to the creation of more SBCOs), I also control for 
demand for certification by including change in prior foundings of farms and change 
in prior percentage of producers certified. Fourth, I control for supply by including 
measures of the number of producers and number of producers squared in a state. 
Including the squared term of this variable is consistent with population ecology 
conventions to capture competitive effects associated with density (Hannan and 
Freeman 1989).  Finally, I control for firm-level characteristics including whether or 
not a firm is an early entrant (entered directory before 1990), age in the industry, and 
the degree to which a firm is vertically integrated. To calculate the degree of vertical 
integration variable, I summed the number of services that the firm provides as listed 
in the directory. For example, if a firm is listed as a producer, but also lists under 
“services” that the firm is a retailer, shipper, and processor, then the firm receives a 
score of 4. All covariates are lagged one year and updated annually. The unit of 
analysis in the entry models is U.S. state; in the exit analyses, it is the firm.  
ANALYSES 
To model market entry, I reverted to the negative binomial model because the 
data violated a key assumption of the Poisson regression (that the conditional mean of 
yearly foundings equals its variance). The negative binomial model remedies this 
problem by adding a parameter to account for the dispersion of the dependent variable. 
Given that the dependent variable is a measure of state counts over time, the 
observations are not independent. As such, it violates the assumption of independence 
among observations. Therefore, I use a negative binomial random effects model to 
account for the state-specific random effect. Doing so allows for interdependent  
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observations by modeling unobserved influences shared by all the counts of a state. 
The form of the model is:  
i ij i ij x θ β θ λ ) exp( ) ( =  
where λij is the predicted foundings in state i  in year j, θi is a gamma-
distributed random effect for region i, and xijβ represents the vector of independent 
variables and coefficients for state i in year j. I estimate random effects models in 
Stata 9 using the xtnbreg command. 
To model market exit, I use discrete-time event history methods because the 
exact timing of market exit is not known and there are many “tied” events in the data. 
Employing discrete time models can handle these problems without introducing bias 
into the parameter estimates (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Yamaguchi 1991). I use a 
complementary log-log model, which is appropriate for longitudinal binary dependent 
variables and is able to handle multiple events within the same time period. The model 
can be expressed as:  
it it X t P ' ) ( )) 1 log( log( β α + = − −  
where the hazard of exit in each year is equivalent to Pit , the conditional probability 
that exit occurs to firm i in year t, given that it has not already occurred and X is a 
vector of covariates. I selected the complementary log-log discrete time model over 
the more common logistic regression model because the complementary log-log is a 
discrete time analogue model to a continuous time hazard model (Singer and Willett 
2003). Although my data on market exit is discrete because of data measurement 
issues (i.e., annual directory information), it is inherently a continuous process. I use 
the xtcloglog command in Stata 9 to model market exit.   
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RESULTS 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the correlations for the market entry and market exit 
analyses, respectively. Table 3.3 presents the results from the negative binomial 
regression of market entry clustered on state. Model 1 is a baseline model with only 
controls. Model 2 includes the number of SBCOs in a state to test hypothesis 1. The 
variable is found to be positive and highly significant, suggesting that greater SBCO 
presence leads to increased entry into the market, supporting hypothesis 1. Controlling 
for demand for certification (captured by the inclusion of the change in prior 
foundings and change in prior percent certified), each additional certification 
organization in a state increases entry rates by 53 percent and is highly significant in 
predicting market entry. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported.  
Table 3.4 presents the results from the maximum likelihood analysis of market 
exit. Model 1 presents the baseline model. Model 2 includes the firm-level third-party 
certification variable. The variable is negative and significant, supporting hypothesis 
2. Controlling for important firm-level variables such as early entry, age, and vertical 
integration, firms that are third-party certified are 57 percent less likely to exit from 
the market. Model 3 includes the measure of SBCO prominence. It is not significant, 
but the sign is in the expected direction. Model 4 includes an interaction term for 
certification and early entrance into the market. The sign is in the expected direction, 
but just misses the .1 significance level. Model 5 includes the interaction term for 
certification and producer density squared. This variable is negative and significant 
(supporting hypothesis 5), suggesting that firm-level certification moderates the 
curvilinear (competitive) effects of producer density. Model 6 is the full model. 
Certification shows a clear negative and significant effect in all previous models. The 
interaction term certification x density squared is also significant in models 5 and 6, 
suggesting that the finding is robust in the face of multicollinearity.   
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TABLE 3.1: CORRELATIONS FOR MARKET ENTRY 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14 
1.  Farmland                
2.  Number  of  farms  .63               
3.  Change  in  #  farms  .21  .07              
4.  Change  in  farmland  -.13  -.06  .20             
5.  Farms/acres  .25  -.24  .04  -.13            
6. Sierra Club   .10  .26  .10  -.05  -.25                   
7.  Wholesaler  density  .07  .15  .08  -.08  -.07  .50          
8. Change in prior foundings  .04  .06  .00  -.04  -.02  .20  .27               
9. Change in prior % certified  -.02  .00  .00  .03  -.03  -.02  -.04  .04             
10.  Producer  density  .08 .15 .11  -.08  -.04 .43 .93 .14  -.05           
11. Producer density
2  .05 .12 .07  -.07  -.04 .34 .82 .23  -.04 .90         
12.  #  legal  provisions  .23 .22 .24  -.02 .06 .21 .29 .07  -.01 .33 .24       
13. # legal provisions
2  .31 .27 .25  -.02 .09 .22 .24 .03  -.01 .29 .21 .93     
14.  %  producers  certified  .00 .06 .10  -.04  -.09 .20 .09 .01  -.20 .13 .05 .27 .20   
15.  Number  SBCOs  -.09 .16 .01 .03  -.25 .45 .35 .09 .02 .31 .25 .30 .20 .38  
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TABLE 3.2: CORRELATIONS FOR MARKET EXIT 
V a r i a b l e  123456   789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
1 . F a r m l a n d                
2.Change  in  #  farms  .29             
3.Change  farmland  -.12 .34            
4.Farms/acres  -.30 -.02 -.06           
5.Sierra  Club    .49 .13 -.26 -.31          
6.Producer  density  .41 .16 -.26 -.23 .73         
7.Producer density
2  .36 .15 -.22 -.21 .63 .97         
8.%  Certified  producers  -.01 .07 -.03 -.02 -.07 .05  .03       
9.Wholesaler  density  .41 .11 -.26 -.24 .76 .84  .79 -.11      
10.Legal  provisions  .50 .28 -.16 -.09 .58 .68  .61 .21 .52     
11.Early entrant  .02 -.07 -.03 .00 .00 -.09  -.09 -.31 .00 -.18      
12.Age in industry  .06 .12 -.03 -.04 .11 .23  .23 .23 .07 .26 .29    
13.Vertical integration  .03 -.02 -.03 .00 .09 .05  .05 -.18 .11 -.01 .17 .02  
14.Certification .03 .04 -.02 -.08 .05 .07  .07 .30 .00 .12 -.19 .11 -.05 
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TABLE 3.3: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS OF MARKET 
ENTRY, 1986–2000 
Variable/ Model #        1       2 
Farmland 8.90e-06  1.24e-05* 
 (7.13e-06)  (6.49e-06) 
Number of farms  6.76e-07  -5.67e-07 
 (4.32e-06)  (3.96e-06) 
Change in # farms  -1.38e-04***  -9.72e-05** 
 (5.23e-05)  (4.60e-05) 
Change in farmland  5.62e-05  2.75e-05 
 (1.65e-04)  (1.43e-04) 
Farms/acres .175  .212 
 (.148)  (.133) 
Sierra Club   .360***  .303*** 
 (.095)  (.091) 
Wholesaler density  -.002  -.000 
 (.006)  (.004) 
Change in prior foundings  .034***  .045*** 
 (.006)  (.006) 
Change in prior % certified  1.788***  1.757*** 
 (.312)  (.310) 
Producer density  .005  .007 
 (.007)  (.006) 
Producer density
2 3.03e-05  9.55e-06 
 (2.66e-05)  (2.38e-05) 
Number of legal provisions  .061***  .052*** 
 (.018)  (.017) 
Number of legal provisions
2 -.002***  -.001*** 
 (.000)  (.000) 
% producers 3rd party certified  .381  .278 
 (.265)  (.258) 
Number of SBCOs    .423*** 
   (.083) 
Constant -3.537***  -3.408*** 
 (.875)  (.813) 
Wald χ
2  223.63*** 283.44*** 
Degrees of Freedom  14  15 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; n=700; 50 states 
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TABLE 3.4: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS:  ORGANIC FOOD MARKET EXIT, 1986–2000 
Variable/  Model  #  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Control Variables        
Number of farms  3.71e-07  4.03e-07  5.45e-07 3.09e-07 4.09e-07 3.53e-07 
 (1.17e-06)  (1.17e-06)  (1.19e-06)  (1.17e-06) (1.17e-06) (1.19e-06) 
Change in # of farms  -1.22e-04***  -1.24e-04***  -1.25e-04*** -1.22e-04*** -1.24e-04*** -1.21e-04*** 
 (3.25e-05)  (3.25e-05)  (3.25e-05)  (3.25e-05) (3.25e-05) (3.25e-05) 
Change in farmland  2.96e-05  2.86e-05 3.23e-05 3.16e-05 2.83e-05 3.34e-05 
 (1.32e-04)  (1.33e-04)  (1.33e-04)  (1.34e-04) (1.32e-04) (1.33e-04) 
Farm/acres  -.041 -.050 -.040 -.048 -.046 -.039 
  (.062) (.062) (.063) (.062) (.062) (.063) 
Sierra  Club    .089** .095** .097** .096** .095** .097** 
  (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) 
Producer  density -.014*** -.015*** -.014*** -.014*** -.015*** -.014*** 
  (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Producer density
2  8.31e-05***  8.94e-05***  8.57e-05***  8.69e-05*** 1.11e-04*** 1.09e-04*** 
 (2.85e-05)  (2.86e-05)  (2.91e-05)  (2.87e-05) (3.04e-05) (3.13e-05) 
%  certified  producers  -.057  .091 .093 .108 .034 .048 
  (.216) (.219) (.219) (.220) (.222) (.223) 
Wholesaler  density  -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 
  (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Legal  provisions  -.005 -.004 -.005 -.004 -.004 -.005 
  (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Early  entrant  -.448*** -.514*** -.511*** -.340*  -.495*** -.261 
  (.122) (.124) (.124) (.178) (.124) (.183) 
Age in industry (ln)  -.202***  -.188***  -.187***  -.180***  -.182***  -.172*** 
  (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; n=2854, 915 firms  
 
1
2
9
 
TABLE 3.4 (Continued) 
Variables/  Model  #  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Control Variables        
Age in industry (ln)  -.202***  -.188***  -.187***  -.180***  -.182***  -.172*** 
  (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) 
Vertical integration  -.172*** -.170*** -.172*** -.170*** -.171*** -.172*** 
  (.034) (.034) (.034) (.034) (.034) (.034) 
Certification 
Variables        
Certification   -.322***  -.272**  -.258**  -.215*  -.091 
    (.095) (.119) (.108) (.112) (.144) 
Cert x early entrant         -.299    -.389* 
     (.226)   (.231) 
SBCO  Prominence      -.347    -.143 
    (.495)    (.506) 
Cert x density
2       -2.61e-05*  -2.99e-05** 
      (1.36e-05)  (1.42e-05) 
        
Constant  -.877** -.748** -.777** -.826** -.805** -.931** 
  (.369) (.370) (.373) (.376) (.372) (.382) 
Wald χ
2  139.38*** 149.01*** 149.37*** 146.93*** 151.30*** 149.68*** 
Degrees  of  Freedom  13 14 15 15 15 17  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The intent of this paper was to explicate the role of standards-based 
certification organizations in the structuring of new markets and to quantitatively 
assess their effects on market entry and exit dynamics. Theoretically, I have argued 
that SBCOs create standards, advocate for their adoption, and then verify and certify 
claims made by adopting organizations. The formal market entry analysis supports the 
claim that in the organic food industry, SBCOs served as both mitigators of 
uncertainty and sources of legitimacy by actively creating and evangelizing standards 
at a broader market level and, at the same time, verifying organic claims and providing 
endorsements to compliant firms. Controlling for alternative explanations, the analysis 
suggests that for each additional SBCO in a state, entry rates into the organic market 
increase by 53 percent.  
The exit analysis suggests that firm-level certification decreases the likelihood 
of exit from a market for which a firm has “authorization” to participate in. Such 
certification can decrease the probability of exit by 57 percent. Further, there is 
evidence that certification moderates the effects of competition, providing a buffer for 
organizations against the competitive effects resulting from increasing density within a 
market. The moderating effect of certification on early entry is not strongly supported.  
Based on these results, this study makes multiple contributions. First, it 
extends research on institutional entrepreneurship by moving beyond process 
explanations of institutional change to focus on how the actions of SBCOs influence 
market dynamics of exit and entry. SBCOs and their standards are inherently 
normative by nature (Scott 1995) and the normative dimensions of institutions are 
understudied (Casile and Davis-Blake 2002). By focusing on the normative efforts of 
SBCOs to impose order on a marketplace, this study provides evidence that entry and  
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exit decisions on the part of firms are subject to broader normative institutional 
influences.  
Another related contribution supports the growing research agenda focused on 
structural aspects of new industry creation, which has begun to examine how new 
market niches and industries become taken for granted. By focusing on the role of 
standardization and certification processes, I advance this agenda and answer calls 
from institutionalists concerned with the role of standards and norms in fostering 
entrepreneurial activity (Hwang and Powell 2005) and entrepreneurship scholars that 
recognize the need for increased attention to the structural and institutional aspects of 
the environment that are beyond the control of entrepreneurs but that nonetheless 
shape the existence of entrepreneurial opportunities and the efficacy of entrepreneurial 
efforts (Eckhardt and Shane 2003).  
Finally, by focusing on an industry in which standards “create” the underlying 
product value, this research expands our conception of the role of standards in market 
creation and growth beyond the important concepts of network externalities and 
interoperability that are well established in the technology literature. Many new 
market niches (particularly those concerned with the environmental and social 
externalities associated with more “traditional” means of production) depend heavily 
on the integrity of standards, verification methods, and endorsement processes for 
value and continued market growth. Thus, it behooves scholars to understand the way 
in which these nascent markets are employing standardization and certification 
processes.  
This preliminary study signals many opportunities for future research. First, 
this analysis is limited to organic producers only. Future research on the role of 
standards in nascent markets would benefit from examining how standardization 
influences all firms along the value chain. For example, because organic wholesalers  
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act as the key interface between producers and retail markets, they are in a position of 
dominance (Hawley 1950). Given their position of both power and uncertainty, 
wholesalers may have been the greatest advocates for third-party certification. 
Examining how third-party certification impinges on and changes value-chain 
dynamics among different organizations would be a promising future direction. 
A second avenue for research would be to examine the implications of the 
organizational vehicle of the standards. For example, Garud et al. (2002) highlight the 
inherent tensions that arose as Sun Microsystems attempted to both create and enforce 
Java as a standard. Future work should examine whether more objective nonprofit and 
government certification organizations face different challenges than for-profit 
certification organizations. Future work could match particular characteristics of firms 
with particular types of SBCOs. For example, small farmers often preferred to certify 
with locally based certification organizations, whereas larger farms and processors 
tended to seek out for-profit, internationally focused certification organizations. An 
analysis of these relationships may yield interesting SBCO-specific dynamics as the 
marketplace for both organic food and certification developed.  
Finally, in this study, I have assumed that the effects of the actions taken by 
SBCOs and their endorsement are constant over time. I have also assumed (aside from 
the early entry/certification interaction variable) that the relative salience or value of 
the certification to broader constituencies is constant as well. Future work should 
determine the degree to which the broader institutional environment endorses or even 
requires third-party certification as a prerequisite for participation in a particular 
market. This study provides a solid foundation from which to develop this broader set 
of theoretical questions. Grappling with these ideas will advance understanding of 
how standards-based certification organizations influence new market creation in a 
more nuanced fashion.   
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